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Despite recent advances in understanding the macroeconomics
of fiscal policy in developing countries, few studies has asked
why  fiscal policies  differ from country  to  country or  what
institutional orlegal arrangements  help maintain fiscal discipline.
This paper finds a positive correlation between political variables
(coups, elections) and  specific fiscal policy  actions using  a
political economy approach.
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Most economists treat fiscal policy as exogenous  policymakers to borrow too heavily and to leave
and consider.  licymakers as machines to be  the bills to their successors.
programmed.  Rarely do they seek to determine
why, for instance, some countries rely on the  - Governments tend to implement adjustment
inflation tax while others use direct taxation, let  policies -including  major devaluations - early
alone what political factors affect such decisions.  in their tenure in office, when they command
Yet without a theory of how fiscal policymakers  political authority.  But if political conflict
behave, at both the revenue and the expenditure  arises, they may lack the strength to change the
levels, there is no guarantee that policy advice  macroeconomic status quo and will resort instead
will turn out to be sound.  to inflation and deficits.
Edwards and Tabellini present the results of  Edwards and Tabellini argue that their
an empirical analysis of the political economy of  results have important implications for the
fiscal policy for a group of developing countries.  design of adjustment and stabilization programs.
They look at alternative ways of incorporating  Institutional reforms that make it hardtr for a
political variables into the explanation of govern-  government to reverse course without warning
ment policy actions.  Dividing their results into  will increase the credibility of the reforms,
three sections, one each for inflation, budget  thereby reducing political instability - and the
deficits, and devaluations, they find that:  equilibrium level of inflation. The creation of
independent central banks should also be a
The equilibrium inflation rate is higher the  priority.  This and other teforms .hat take money
more citizens disagree about which party should  creation out of the hands of governments will
hold office, and the more unlikely it is that the  boost macroeconomic stability
government currently in office will be reap-
pointed.  Their results serve as a general endorsement
of World Bank conditionality.
* Political instability and polarization lead to
a collective myopia that sometimes tempts
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The importance  of fiscal  policy  in  the  developing  countries  has long
been  recognized.  More  and  more  economists  have  recently  argued  that  fiscal
policy  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  determination  of  overall  economic
performance  In  the  LDCs. In  fact,  new  empirical  studies  suggest  that
macroeconomic  (and  especially  fiscal)  stability  nay  indeed  be  an  important
element  in  explaining  the  difference  in  real  performance  between  the  East
Asian  and  the  Latin  American  countries.I
However,  in  spite  of  important  recent  developments  in  theoretical,  and
to  some  extent  empirical,  aspects  of  the  macroeconomics  of  fiscal  policy,
modern  analyses  have  until  now failed  to  address  the  key question  of  what
determines  a  country's  fiscal  stance.  In  a  phrase,  the  problem  Is  that
economists  most  of  the  time  treat  fiscal  policy  as  exogenous,  and  consider
the  policymaker  to  be  like  a  machine  that  can  be  programmed.  Very  few
studies  ask  questions  like: 'Why  do  some  countries  rely  heavily  on  the
Inflation  tax,  while  others  use  primarily  direct  taxation?"  Or,  "Why  do
some  Central  Banks  (or  monetary  systems  for  that  matter)  allocate  a  high
proportion  of  their  credit  to  the  public  sector  and  others  don't?"  Even
fewer  studies  have  used  modern  economic  analysis  to  ask  what  type  of
institutions  or  legal  arrangements  will  help  maintain  fiscal  discipline  and
sustain  stabilization  efforts.  There  is  little  hope  that  we  will  be  able  to
provide  lasting  policy  advice  until  we  understand  the  forces  underlying  the
Iin  nost  (but  not  all)  Latin  American  countries  we  observe  cycles  that
go  from  fiscal  Indiscipline  to  real  exchange  rate  overvaluation,  to
increased  trade  restrictions  and  exchange  controls.  There  is  wide  agreement
that  this  scenario  Is  translated  Into  poor  economic  performance.  On  the
other  hand,  this  typo  of  behavior  has  been  largely  absent  in  the  East  Asian
nations.  See,  for  example,  the  Wiorld  Develonment  ReaD=  1988  as  well  as
the  abundant  literature  on  adjustment  that  has  emanated  in  the  last  few
yeari  from  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF.2
di,!-  rences  in  fiscal  hehavio 6,  both  at  the  revenue  and  expenditure  levels.
To  answer  these  questions  we  need  to  formulate  a  positive  theory  of  how
policymakers  behave.
A relatively  small  but  growing  body  of  literature  has  Indeed  recently
pursued  a  positive  approach  to  the  theory  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,
building  on  insights  developed  from  game  theory  and  irom  the  theory  of
public  choice.  This  literature,  whit.  h.as come  to  be  known  collectively  as
the litical Scon2m  approach  to  macroeconomic  policy,  tries  to  explain
specific  macroeconomic  actions  of  policymakers,  including  their  inclination
towards  given  expenditure  patterns,  and  their  reliance  on  particular  sources
of  revenue.  Most  of  this  literature,  however,  has  been  theoretical  and  has
dealt  almost  exclusively  with the advanced nations.  The purpose of this
paper  is  to  provide  a (partial)  remedy  to  this  situation,  by  presenting  a
series  of  empirical  results  on  the  political  econoay  of  inflation  and  fiscal
pollcy  for  a  group  of  developing  countries.  More  specifically,  we  discuss
in  detail  alternative  vays  of incorporating  empirically  political  variables
into  the  explanation  of  government  policy  actions.  In  doing  this  we both
survey  some of  the  limited  existing  empirical  literature  on  the  subject,  and
we  report  new results  for  a cross  section  of  countries.  The  emphasis  of  the
paper  is  eminently  e£1rxLal.  This  has  been  delibera%e,  since  we believe
that  it  is  precisely  in  this  area  wh2re  a  major  research  effort  is  required.
In  fact,  throughout  the  paper  we argue  that  many of  tho  Insights  and
implications  of  the  political  economy models  can  be  empirically  tested,  and
we suggest  specLfic  ways of  doing  so. Those  readers  interested  in  pursulng
ln  greater  detail  the  theoretical  angles  of  this  topic  are  referred  to  the
survey  by  Pemason and  Tabellinl  (1990),  and  to  the  literature  cited  there.3
The  paper  is  divided  into  three  parts  that  deal,  respectively,  with
inflation,  budget  deficits  and  devaluations.  In  the  first  phrt  the  recent
literature  on  the  theory  of  inflation  is  .eviewed,  and  time  series  and  cross-
country  data  are  used  to  investigate  the  validity  of  a  number  of  recent
theoretical  propositions.  We  report  results  that  support  the  view  that
variables  related  to  political  factors  help  explain  cross-country  different-
ials  in  the  inflation  tax. The  second  part  of  the  paper  reviews  the  theory
and  th  avidence  on  government  budget  deficits,  and  government  borrowing.
Here,  the  central  finding  is  that  more  unstable  political  systems  tend  to  be
associated  with  larger  borrowing.  Finally,  the  third  pa&t  of  the  paper
focuses  on  the  stabilization  episodes  in  developing  countries.  We  argue  that
the  failure  of  some  of  these  episodes  is  rooted  In  both  political  weakness  of
the  government  and  on  political  instability  of  the  country.  We  analyze  this
proposition  empirically  by  focusing  on 39  stabilization  periods.  Our
findings,  based  on  nonparametric  techniques,  support  the  hypothesis  that
stabilizations  tend  to  fail  in  those  nations  with  more  unstable  politics.
The  last  section  contains  brief  concluding  remarks  and  proposes  new  direc-
tions  for  future  research.  Finally,  the  paper  has  two  appendices:  Appendix
7 deals  with  tests  of  the  optimal  tax  theory  of  Inflation;  Appendix  II  deals
with  the  measurement  of  political  instability.
In  this  section  we  systematically  analyze  the  theory  and  evidence  on
Inflation  for  a  large  group  of  developing  countries.  We  start  by  providing
a  broad  analysis  of  the  data  and  then  move  to  test  whether  political  yari-
ables  help  explain  the  observed  cross  country  variability  in  the  inflation
tax. More  specifically,  we investigate  the  most  important  empirical4
Implications  of  credibility  based  models  and  of  models  that  rely  on  the  Idea
cf  strategic  government  behavior.
11.1 IL  Inflation  Tax
Table  1  contains  data  on  Inflation  and  on  seignorage  for  52  devaloping
countries  for  four  subperiods  between  1963  and  1987: 1963-73,  1973-13,  1978-
83  and  1983-87. For  each  subperiod  we  have  presented  data  on  the  averaL
rate  of  inflation  --  that  is  the  average  rate  of  change  In  the  consumption
price  index  --  as well  as the  average  revenue  from the  Inflation  tax,  expres-
sed  as  a  per_entage  of  GDP. For  every  year  this  revenue  was  computed  as:
R  NM  vzm(1)
where w  is  the  inflation  rate, m  is  the  monetary  base  and y  is  GDP. 3
All  the  data  were  obtained  from  the  most  recent  IFS  tape. 4
These  figures  strikingly  illustrate  a  wide  variabtlity  in  the  inflation
tax,  both  across  countries  and  across  time. First,  In  almost  every  case
there  Is  an  important  increase  in  the  rate  of  the  inflation  tytY  in  the  late
1970s  and  early  1980s.  Second,  the  croa country  variability  is  remarkable,
both  regarding  the  rates  as  well  as  revenues.  For  the  period  1963-73  the
ratio  of  higher  to lower  rate  of the inflation  tax  was  41 times  For  1983-
2The  countries  have  been  grouped  geographically.
3In  the  actual  computations  we  used  nominal  m  and y.  If  real  base
and  GDP  are  used  the  results  would  be  the  same,  as  long  as  we  use  the  CDP
deflator  to  compute  the  real  stock  of  monetary  base.
4A  i..roblem  with  the  raw  IFS  data  is  that  while  the  price  level  is  a
yearly  average  the  monetary  figures  are wend  of year*. This was tackled  by
"centering*  the  monetary  variables  and,  thus,  constructing  yearly  waverage"
figures  for  the  monetary  variables.5
87  this  ratio  had  climbed  to  more than one  thousand  timesl 5 Third,  In  some
countries  such  as  Ghana  (A3-78  vs.  78-83);  Malawi  (73-78  vs.  78-83);  Zaire
(73-78  vs.  78-83);  and  tolle  (63.73  vs. i.  78),  Increases  In  the  rate  of  the
inflation  tax (a) were  associated  with  daclines  in  revenue  from  the
Inflation  tax.6 Fourth,  contrary  to  the  popular  belief,  we  observe  very
wlde  differences  In  behavior  within  Latin  America.  For  example,  in  every
period  we  can  find  some  Latin  American  countries  with  a  very  low  rate  of
Inflation;  in  fact,  lower  than  the  average  of  the  Asian  nations.  This  is  an
important  finding  since  it  provides  a  devastating  counterexample  to  the
popular  "geographical"  or  'cultural'  theory  of  inflation  differentials
across  countrles.  According  to  that  view  cultural  reasons  explain  why  Latin
America  is  fiscally  irresponsible.  Our  data,  however,  show  that  Latin
America  is  far  from  being  a  homogeneous  group.  Thus,  any  good  theory  that
attempts  to  explain  the  determinants  of  fiscal  policy  and  the  Inflation  tax
should  be  capable  of  explaining  the  different  behavior  encountered  within
the  Latin  American  regicn.
Figures  1  through  3  depict  the  relatiorahip  between  the  rate  of
inflation  and  the  log  of  the  inflation  tax  revew%e  for  a  group  of  selected
countries.  These  diagrams  suggest  that  In  most  of  tnese  coantries  there  is
a  Laffer  curve  type  relation  between  the  rate  of  inflation  and  the  Inflation
tax  revenue.  Moreover,  they  also  suggest  that  at  one  point  or  another  some
of  these  countries  may  indeed  have  been  on  the  'wrong  side'  of  this  curve.
5This  excludes  Togo  which  has  a  negative  recorded  r4te  of  Inflation
tax.
6The  extent  of  this  phenomenon  is  probably  greater  than  what  Is
apparent  from  Table  1,  since,  as  argued  by  Tanzi  (1977)  and  Oliver&  (1967),
inflation  may  reduce  the  base  of  other  taxes  --  either  through  encouraging
the  underground  economy  or  because  of  collection  lags.6
To  sum  up,  then,  the  data  presented  here  shows  a  remarkable  variety  of
cross-country  experiences  with  the  inflation  tax. The  empiricai  challenge
faced  by  the  analyst  is  to  expl&in  these  differences  in  behavior  across
countries  and  time. In  the  rest  of  this  section  we  take  up  this  challenge
by  empirically  investigating  the  way  in  which  political  variables  affect  the
degree  of  reliance  on  the  inflation  tax.
II.2 Credibility  and  Inflation
A number  of  authors  have  recently  investigated  whether  the  evolution  of
inflation  conforms  to  the  theory  of  optimal  taxation. 7 These  studies  have
found  that  for  most  countries  the  central  implications  of  that  theory  are
rejected  by  the  data.8  The  main  exception  to  these  findings  is  the  U.S.
(see  Mankiw  1987). In  Appendix  I  to  this  paper  the  regression  results  we
report  for  29  csveloping  nations  shlow  that  the  hypothesis  that  inflation
follows  an  optimal  path  is  rejected.
Perhaps  the  simplest  explanation  of  why  governments  do  not  behave
according  to  the  theory  of  optimal  taxation  is  that  they  lack  credibility.
Since  the  work of Calvo (1978)  and  Kydland-Prescott  (1977),  it is  well  known
that  the  optimal  inflation  tax  is  time-inec.nsistent  in  the  absence  of
binding  policy  commitments.  In  a  credible  (or  time  consistent)  equilibrium
with  policy  discretion,  the  government  relies  too  much  on  the  inflation  tax.
The  reason  for  this  is  that  once  the  public  has  chosen  its  money  balances  it
is  in  the  government's  interest  to  rely  more  heavily  on  inflation  as  a
7The  most  important  implication  of  the  theory  of  inflation  as  optimal
taxation  is that,  to the  extent  that  all taxes  have distortionary  effects,
they  should  exhibit  co-movements  through  time. The  reason  for  this  is  that
a  government  that  minimizes  welfare  costs  will  equalize  the  marginal  cost  of
different  taxes  at  r  mome  Ln  tL  e
8A  battery  of  tests  have  been  used  to  investigate  the  validity  of  the
optimal  tax  implications.  See  the  brief  review  in  Appendix  I  of  this  paper.7
source  of revenue. Moreover,  in  any  such  equilibrium,  the  inflation  tax  is
a residual: any  change  in government  spending  is  reflected  one-for-one  in
higher  inflation,  with  little  or  no  effect  on  other  sources  of  revenue  (see
Persson-Tabellini  (1990)).  Also,  as  Calvo  (1978)  and  Persson-Tabellini
(1990)  have  pointed  out,  policy  discretion  generally  results  in  multiple
equilibria.  Thus,  any  specific  equilibrium  is  intrinsically  "fragile".
This  may  result  in  sudden  bursts  of  accelerating  inflation,  accompanied  by
devaluations  and  speculative  attacks  on  fixed  ecchange  rate  regimes. 9
The  recent  literature  on  credibility  has  argued  that  reputation  can  be
a substitute  for  commitments.  This  suggests  an  obvious  line  of  attack:  to
try  and  explain  differences  in  the  observed  rates  of  inflation  in  various
countries  as  due  to  differences  in  the  strength  of  reputational  incentives
in  each  country.  Persson  and  Tabellini  (1990)  have  formulated  a  simple
model  of  reputation  with  enough  institutional  content  to  yield  positive  pre-
dictions.  The  model  is  built  on  three  cc  :al  assumptions:  (X.)  unexpected
policy  actions  disrupt  the  system  of  expectations  of  private  economic  agents
(for  instance,  leading  to  higher  erpected  inflation  and  to  higher  nowinal
wages); (il) this  disruption  of  economic  expectations  has  negative  welfare
effects  on  tha  voters; (iii) electing  a  new  government  reduces  the  extent
nf  the  disruption  (i.e.,  stabil!zes  expectations),  as  the  economy  focuses  on
a  new  set  of  policy  proposals.  This  model  of  reputation  points  out  that  the
government  incentive  to  maintain  its  reputation  has  an  important  political
dimension:  the  cost  of  policy  surprises  is  that  the  government  is  less
9These  qualitative  properties  of  models  with  policy  discretion  are
remarkably  consistent  with the  empirical  evidence  reported  in  Section  II.3
on  optimal  taxation  and  with  evidence  on  devaluations  reported  in  Section  IV
below. Moreover,  they  are  robust:  for  instance,  they  would  also  result
(with  some  qualifications)  from  models  in  which  even  actual  (and  not  just
expected)  inflation  is  distorting  or  undesirable.8
lilkel,  to  be reappointed  in office. The  citizens  realize  that reappointing
a government  who created  policy  surprlnes  means  higher  expected  inflation  in
the future,  and  hence  lower  social  welfare. Thus, they  are less  likely  to
reappoint  him.  If the  government  cares  about  being in  office,  this
"punishment"  creates  incentives  not to engage  in  policy  surprises.
The Persson-Tabellini  model  of reputation  yields  two  central  pofit.ve
implications,  which  can, In  printiple,  be subject  to some form  of empirical
testing. First,  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate is  higher  the  more the
citizens  disagree  about  which  governrent  they  prefer  to  hold office. In
ether  words,  more polarized  and "heterogeneous"  societies  encounter  greater
difficulty  in enforcing  low  inflation  through  reputatio%Pl  forc"s. Second,
the  equilibrium  inflation  rate  tends  to be  higher  the  more unlikAly  it is
that  the government  currently  in office  will be reappointed. In ot.er  words,
reputation  is  not  very effective  if the  government  is "weak". Intuitively,
the  threat  of  being thrown  out  of office  becomes  less  powerful  if society  is
very polarized,  or if the  government  is already  weak.  In the last  case,  this
occurs  because  a  weak government  has little  to lose (since  it is  already
likely  to be thrown  out  of office  anyway). In the  former  case, it  occurs
because  if society  is  very  polarized,  citizens  are  unwilling  to switch  party
and  punish  a government  just  because  it  created  policy  surprises.
A serious  problem  in testing  the  main implications  of the  Persson-
Tabellini  model (and,  for  that  matter,  of  most political  economy  models)
resides  on finding  empirical  counterparts  for  the  key political  variables,
such as political  instability,  weakness  atnd  polarLzation. In this  paper  we
have tackled  this  problem  by using  two  broad  data sets on political  and
institutional  characteristics  of countries,  assembled  by Banks  and  Taylor  and
Jodice  (1983),  to construct  proxies  for these  theoretical  concepts. These9
data  sets  include  time  series  information  on  changes  in  government,  coup
attempts  (successful  or  unsuccessful)  and  political  motivated  riots,  among
others,  and  canv,  thus,  be  used  to  both  classify  countries  into  different
political  categories  and  to  construct  Indexes  of  political  instability.  In
Appendix  II  of  this  paper  we  include  a  detailed  discussion  on  possible
alternative  ways  of  actually  measuring  political  variables  and  we explain,  at
some  length,  the  procedures  that  we  have  actually  used  in  this  paper.
In  Table  2  we  report  some  preliminary  evidence  consistent  with  the  two
main  implications  of  the  Persson-Tabellini  model  on  credibility  and  reputa-
tion.  This  table  reports  the  results  of estimeting  a simple  OLS regression
of  avera3e  inflation  against  various  measures  of  political  instability  and
polarization,  on  cross-country  data  (see  Appendix  II  for  greater  details  on
measurement  issues,.  In  the  first  spi.Jification  of  Table  2,  political
instability  is  measured  as  the  frequency  of  (regular  and  irregular)  govern-
-aent  changes  during  the  relevant  time  interval.  We  interpret  this  variable
as  beirxg  a  proxy  for  the  probability  -f  the  governmenc  being  replaced.  In
the  second  specification  we  distinguish  between  the  frequency  of  regular
government  changes  and  the  frequency  of  coups. Since  the  latter  form  of
government  transfer  is  likely  to  Involve  a  more  radical  change  in  the
ideology  of  the  government,  the  frequency  of  coups  is  a  measure  of  both
instability  snd  polarization  of  the  political  system.  The  results  are  quite
striking:  the  estimated  coefficients  are  always  positive  and  generally
highly  significant  for  most  time  periods. 10
10The  same  results  are  obtained  if  we  replace  the  actual  frequency  of
government  change  with  the  expected  probability  of  a  government  change,
estimated  from  a  probit  model.  ThiF  alternative  measure  of political
instability,  used for  the  first  time  in  Cukierman,  Edwards  and Tabellini
(1989),  i.  d' 4scussed  later  in  the  text  and  described  in  greater  detail
Appendix.10
Naturally,  the  evidence  reported  in  Table  2 could  have several  other
explanati-ns,  some  of  which  will  ba addressed  in later  sections  of the
paper.  One  such  explanation,  however,  is the  one summarized  in the  previous
pages: more unstable  and  polarized  countries  have greater  credibility
problems,  because  the  reputational  incentives  of a  government  are  weaker. 11
11.3 Long  Run Seigrora2e.  Tax  Reforms  and  Political  Instability
Our  preceding  analysis  centered  on the  behavior  of inflation  and
government  debt in developing  countries  through  time. We now turn to the
question  of  how to compare  the  Iona-run  properties  of these  same  variables
across  countries.
According  to the  theory  of optimal  taxation,  the long-run  properties  of
the inflaf;ion  tax  rate  and  of government  debt  will depend  on the  cost  of
administering  tax  collection. High tax  collectlon  costs  and tax  evasion
force  developing  countries  to rely  on  highly  inefficient  forms  of taxation,
11In a recent  paper  David  Romer (1989)  has  propcsed  an alternative
procedure  for  testing  whether  the  absence  of commitment  matters  in  monetary
policy. H.s  main proposition  is that  in the  absence  of commitment,  there
will be an  inverse  relationship  between  Inflation  and  openness. The reason
for  this,  Romer  argues,  is  that  engaging  in  surprice  monetary  expansions  --
as a government  will tend  to do in  the  absence  of commitment  *-  will
generate  an exchange  rate  depreciation.  To the  extent  that  the  cost  of
depreciation  increases  with openness,  more open  countries  will,  in the
absence  of commitment,  tend  to  have lower  inflation. Using  a  sample  of 57
countries  (both  industrialized  as  well  as LDCs)  Romer  finds  some  empirical
support  for  his  model.  Indeed  when  only developing  nations  are  considered,
he obtains  coefficients  for  openness  that  range  from  -1.237  to -2.417,  and
are always  significant. Although  Romer's  work constitutes  an early  attempt
at empirically  testing  the  credibility  hypothesis,  and  his results  are
somewhat  suggestive,  his analysis  is  not  free  of  problems. Perhaps  the  most
important  limitation  of this  study  is  the  contention  that  expansive  monetary
surprises  will generate  a depreciation.  This  is only  valid in the  context
of freely  fluctuating  nominal  exchange  rate  regimes. If,  on the  other  hand,
the country  in  question  has  a predetermined  nominal  exchange  rate system  --
as most LDCs do --  surprise  monetary  expansions  will generally  tend  to
result  in  no immediate  change  in the  nominal  exchange  rate  and in  a real
exchange  rate  appreciation,  rather  than  depreciation.  Only eventually,  once
international  reserves  are  exhausted,  will  monetary  surprises  result  in a
devaluation  crisis.11
such  as  inflation  or  trade  related  taxes.  This  explanation  raises  a  natural
question.  Why  do  some  countries  have  higher  tax  collection  costs  and  higher
tax  evasion  than  others?  In  the  traditional  development  literature,  this
question  is  answered  by  arguing  that  the  taxing  capacity  of  a  country  is
technologically  constrained  by  its  stage  of  development  and  by  the  structure
of  its  economy:  a  country  with  a large  agricultural  sector,  for  instance,
is  more susceptible  to tax  evasion  than  a  country  with a  large  corporate
manufacturing  industry.  Cukierman,  Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1990)  have
explored  an  alternative  answer  to  this  question.  Namely,  that  the  evolution
of  the  tax  system  of  a  country  depends  on  the  features  of  its  political
system,  and  not just on those  of its  economy.
Their  central  idea  can  be  stated  as  follows.  An inefficient  tax  system
(i.e.,  one  that  facilitates  tax  evasion  and  imposes  high  tax  collection
costs)  acts as a  constraint  on the  revenue  collecting  capacities  of the
government.  This  constraint  may  be  welcomed  by  those  who  disagree  with  the
goals  pursued  by  the  current  goverNment.  In  particular,  a  government  (or  a
legislative  majority)  may  deliberately  refrain  from  reforming  a  tax  system,
for  fear  that  a  more  efficient  tax  apparatus  will  be  used  in  the  future  to
carry  out  spending  or  redistributive  programs  that  the  current  government
disapproves  of. Of  course,  this  is  more  likely  to  happen  in  countries  with
more  unstable  and  polarized  political  systems.  Hence,  more  unstable  and
polarized  political  systems  rely  on  inefficient  taxes,  such  as  soignorage  and
trade  taxes,  to  a greater  extent  than  more  stable  and  homogeneous  countries.
Cuikerman,  Edwards,  Tabellini  (1990)  (CET)  confront  the  data  by
estimating  an  equation  of  the  following  form:
y _ f(x,p)12
where y  - fraction  of  total  revenue  collected  through  seignorage
x  - vector  of  variables  measuring  the  available  tax  bases  (such  as
size  of  the  manufacturing,  mining,  and  agricultural  sectors,
size  of  imports  and  exports,  per  capita  income,  etc.  --  see
Tait,  Gratz  and  Eichengreen  (1979)).
p  *  vector  of  political  variables  measuring  the  political
instability  and/or  polarization  of  the  country.
The  key  empirical  issue  addressed  by  CET  refers  to  the  explanatory  power  of
the  political  variables,  once  we  control  for  the  structural  economic  vari-
ables. CET  use  an  estimated  cross-country  probit  equation  in  order  to
compute  an  index  of  the  probabillty  of  government  change  for  a  particular
country  in  any  given  year. This  probit  equation,  which  is  explained  in
great  detail  in  Appendix  II,  regresses  instances  of  actual  government
changes  against  political  variables  (riots,  repressions,  and  so  on),
economic  variables  (consumption  growth,  inflation,  income  per  capita)  and
institutional  variables.  With  respect  to  polarization  they  use  two
alternative  proxies:  (i) freqtency  of  coup  attempts;  (ii) an  index  of
income  distribution.  This  constructed  indicator  of  political  instability
differs  from  the  index  of  actual  frequency  of  government  change  used  in
Table  2,  in  that  it  provldes  a  measure  of  the  expects  probability  of
government  change,  derived  from  broad  cross  country  evidence.
In  addition  to  the  political  instabillity  index,  in  thelr  regressions  on
seignorage,  CET  included  the  following  structural  variables:  (a) share  of
agriculture  in  GDP. Its  sign  is  expected  to  be  positive:  since  it  is
relatively  costly  to  tax  agriculture,  governments  with  a  large  agricultural
sector  will  tend  to  rely  more  heavily  on  taxes  with  low  administering  cost,
such  as  seignorage  and  trade  taxes; (b) share  of  mining  and  manufacturLng13
on  GDP. Its  sign  is  expected  to  be  negative,  also  for  cost  effective
reasons;  (c) foreign  trade  share  on  GDP. Its  sign  is  expected  to  be
positive,  since  in  an  open  economy  it  is  easier  to  tax  international  trade;
(d) GDP  per  capita  whose  sign  is  expected  to  be  negative.  Moti  advanced
nations  are  able  to  implement  more  sophisticated  and  efficient  tax  systems,
and  thus  will  tend  to  rely  less  heavily  on  easy  to  collect  but  highly
distortive  taxes  such  as  trade  taxes;  and  (e) urbanization  ratio,  whose
sign  is  expected  to  be  negative.  The  reason  is  that  it  is  relatively  easier
to  tax  the  urban  population  than  the  rural  population.
For  a  sample  of  58  developing  nations,  CET  obtained  the  following
results  from  an  OLS  regression  (standard  errors  in  parentheses)  of  seignor-
12 age  on  political  instability  and  other  structural  variables:
Seignorage  - - 0.020  +  0.0021 Share  of  Agriculture  in  GDP
(0.032)  (0.0005)
- 0.0431 Openness  - 0.44E-5  GDP  Capita
(0.0182)  (0.024E-5)
+  0.0019  Urbanization  +  0.1583  Political  Instability  Index
(0.0004)  (0.0539)  -2  - 0.44
S.E.  - 0.049
The  CET  results  are  very  suggestive.  Not  only  does  the  regression
explain  a  high  percentage  of  the  cross-country  variability  of  seigniorage,
1 2A1l  variables  are  measured  as  averages  for  1971  - 1982. Seigniorage
is  the  change  of  high  powered  money  as  a  percentage  of  government  tax
revenue  plus  increase  in  high  powered  money. Openness  is  measured  as  Import
plus  export  over  GDP. Notice  that  this  equation  excludes  the  mining  and
manufacturing  shares.  Including  results  in  an  insignificant  coefficient,
with  the  expected  sign,  with  no  other  changes  in  the  regression.14
but  all  variables  have  the  expected  sign.  Moreover,  the  coefficient  of
the  political  instability  index  is  highly  significant.  When  a  broader  group
of  countries  that  includes  industrialized  nations  was  considered,  the
results  were  similar  to  those  reported  here. All  in  all,  then,  the  CET
results  provide  broad  support  for  the  hypothesis  that,  even  after  control-
ling  for  other  structural  variables,  political  variables  play  an  important
role  in  explaining  lone-run  cross-country  differentials  in  inflation.
An interesting  empirical  extension  of  the  CET  (1990)  model  is  that  the
use  of  other  inefficient  taxes,  such  as  import  tariffs  and  export  taxes,
should  also  be  positively  related  to  political  instability.  That  is,  just
as in the  case  of seignorage,  after  controlling  for  other  structural  vari-
ables,  political  instability  and  the  reliance  on  taxes  on  foreign  trade
should  be positively  related  in  cross-country  data.  This conjecture  is
tested  in  Table  3  on  a  cross  section  of  industrialized  and  developing 14
countries. The dependent  variable  is the ratio  of trade  taxes  as  a
percentage  of  government  revenues  obtained  from  the  IMF  Govenment  Financial
jtaiiGajL. As  in  the  CET seignorage  paper  structural  and  political  vari-
ables  are  included  as  regressors.  The  political  variables  are  the  estimated
political  instability  index  described  above,  the  observed  frequency  of
regular  (democratic)  government  change  and the  frequency  of coups.  In
addition,  we  incorporated  a  dummy  variable  for  industrialized  nations  and
one  for  Latin  American  countries.
13Urbanization  has  a  positive  rather  than  negative  coefficient.  This
however  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  political  polarization  matters:
political  disagreement  is  generally  considered  by  political  scientists  to  be
more  acute  in  urban  areas.
14See  Appendix  for  list  of  countries.15
The  results  in  Table  3 are  mixed.  First  the  coefficients  for  the
structural  variables,  with  the  exception  of  GDP  per  capita  in  two  of  the
regressions,  have  the  expected  sign,  and  some  of  them  are  highly  signific-
ant.  5  Second,  in  both  regressions  where  it  is  included,  the  political
instability  index  has  the  expected  positive  sign;  however,  in  neither  was
its  coefficient  significant.  Third,  when  the  frequency  of  coups  is  added,
as  a  proxy  for  political  polarization,  its  coefficient  is  positive  as
expected  but.  again,  it  is  not  significant  at  conventional  levels.  More-
over,  in this last  regression,  the  frequency  of regular  government  transfers
has  the  wrong  sign. These  less  than  fully  satisfactory  results  on  trade
taxes  contrast  with  the  highly  supportive  results  obtained  by  CET  (1990)  for
seigniorage.  A possible  explanation  for  these  differences  is  that,  contrary
to  the  case  of  seigniorage,  trade  taxes  also  play  an  important  role  in
determining  the  productive  structure  of  a  country.  Indeed,  by  providing
protection  to  certain  sectors  these  types  of  taxes  shape  the  incentive
structure  of  the  economy.  An  additional  difference  between  seignorage  and
trade  taxes  is  that,  while  seignorage  can  be  manipulated  through  administra-
tive  decisions,  changes  in  trade  taxes  usually  require  congressional
approval.  Once  these  elements  are  incorporated  into  the  analysis,  the
straightforward  implication  of  the  CET  model  of  strategic  government
behavior  may  not  be  applicable  to  trade  taxes.
The  empirical  evidence  discussed  in  this  section  can  be  summarized  as
follows:  (1) the  data  for  a large  number  of  developing  nations  rejects  the
optimal  taxation  hypothesis  of  seignorage.  This  means,  then,  that  explana-
tions  of  cross  country  differences  in  inflation  and  seignorage  should  be
15In  fact,  for  many  of  the  coefficients  with  t-statistics  below  two,
the  probability  that  they  had  the  expected  sijn  was  fairly  high.16
sought  outside  of  the  realm  of  the  optimal  policy  framework;  (2) the
incorporation  of  political  and  institutional  variables,  such  as  frequency  of
government  changes,  military  coups  and  a  corstructed  political  instability
index,  indicate  that  these  variables  play  an  important  role  in  explaining
cross  country  variability  in  inflation.  More  specifically,  we  find  evidence
supporting  the  most  important  empirical  implications  of  the  "credibility-
based  theory"  of  economic  policy  and  of  the  strategic  political  government
behavior  of  tax  reforms.
III. Fiscal  Deficit
In  this  section  we  move  away  from  inflation,  and  turn  our  attention  to
fiscal  deficits.  More  specifically,  we  investigate  the  evidence  on  govern-
ment  borrowing  and  we  attempt  to  explain  observed  cross  country  differences
with  the  help  of  some  recent  developments  in  the  positive  theory  of  fiscal
policy.
III.1 Government  "Borrowing"  From  the  Monetary  System  and  Fiscal  Deficits:
The Eyide=c
Tables  4 and  5  contain  important  data  on  two  indicators  of  fiscal
policy  for  our  52  countries.  Table  7A  contains  two  measures  of  the  size  of
budget  deficits:  the  ptblic  sector  borrowing  from  the  domestic  monetary
system,  and  the  fiscal  deficits  of  the  central  government,  both  as  percent-
ages  of  GDP. Both  variables  are  imperfect  measures  of  the  true  budget
deficit,  but  for  different  reasons.  The  most  important  limitation  of  the
first  variable  is  that  it  excludes  borrowing  by  the  government  from  private
non-bank  investors  and  from  foreign  creditors.  The  second  variable,  on  the
other  hand,  in  principle  includes  all  the  borrowing  done  by the  central
government,  irrespective  of  who  is  the  creditor.  But  the  quality  of  the
data Is much less  reliable,  and  it  is less  directly  comparable  across17
countries  since  the  definition  of what is included  in the  central  government
accounts  differs  greatly  across  countries  --  see,  for  example,  World
Develovment  Report  1988,  p. 47,  and  Blejer  and  Chu (1988).
Table  4B displays  the  correlation  coefficients  between  these  two
alternative  measures  of budget  deficit,  for  different  time  periods. They
are always  positive  and  quite  high at least  over some  time  periods. On the
other  hand, the  fact that  in  many cases  the  correlation  coefficient  is low
highlights  the  measurement  problems  faced  in this  area  of macroeconomics.
Most of the  main conclusions  obtained  for  the  inflation  tax  are
applicable  to  both indicators  in  Table  4A:  we observe  important  differences
across  countries  and  across  time,  as well as across  countries  within  a
region. Moreover,  there  is a clear  relation  between  Table  1 and  Table  4A,
tending  to support  the long  maintained  hypothesis  that  budget  deficits  are
an important  determinant  of inflation. This  suggestion  is further  strength-
ened  by  the  evidence  reported  in  Table  5.  This  table  contains  data  on  the
proportion  of  the  Central  Bank's  credit  that  goes  to  the  (central)
government. These  data  are  quite  striking,  showing  that  while in some
countries  (mainly  in  Africa)  the  government  gets  as much of 80%  of the
credit,  in  others  it  obtains  as little  as 15  percent (e.g.,  Korea). These
differences  across  countries  are  possibly  capturing  a  number  of characteris-
tics  of these  countries,  including  the  degree  of development  of the  domestic
capital  market,  the  stage  of development  of the  countries  and their  ability
to  borrow  from  the  world  capital  market. However,  the  cross  country
differences  appear  to  be too large  to  be explained  by economic  variables
only.  This indeed  suggests  that Institutional  and  political  aspects  play an
important  role in explaining  these  differences  in  behavior. Studying  the
role  of these  political  and institutional  variables  is the  main purpose  of18
the  recenit  theory  that  we  describe,  and  scrutinize  empirically,  in  the
remainder  of  this  section.
II.2  PoLtical  Instability  and  Budget  Deficit
We  have  argued  in  the  preceding  sections  that  political  instability  and
disagreement  between  current  and  future  political  majorities  can  explain  why
countries  retain  inefficient  tax  systems  without  attempting  to reform  them.
The  reason  for  this  is  that  political  instability  can  lead  to  a form  of
collective  myopia.  This  same  intuitive  reason  has  been  investigated  in  a
number  of  recent  papers  by  Tabellini  and  Alesina  (1990),  Alesina  and
Tabellini  (1989,  1990',  and  Persson  and  Svensson  (1989),  to  explain  the
occurrence  of  budget  deficits.
Consider  a  policymaker  (or  a  political  majority)  who  must  choose  how
much  to  spend  and  tax  in  the  current  period,  and  what  to  spend  on  or  whom  to
tax. When  setting  policy,  this  policymaker  chooses  both  the  intertemporal
profile  of  spending  and  taxes  as  well  as  how  to  allocate  the  resources
acquired  by  issuing  debt  (or  the  resources  lost  through  a  surplus).  Suppose
that  this  policymaker  is  aware  that  in  the  future  he  may  be  replaced  by  a
policymaker  (or  majority)  with  different  preferences  about  some  aspects  of
fiscal  policy.  Moreover,  he  realizes  that,  whereas  he  is  in  control  of  how
to  allocate  the  proceeds  of  his  borrowing,  the  allocation  of  the  burden  of
repaying  the  debt  in  the  future  may  not  be  under  his  control.  This
asymmetry  may prevent  today's  policymaker  from fully  internalizing  the  costs
of  running  a  deficit,  the  more  so  the  greater  is  the  difference  between  his
preferences  and  the  expected  preferences  of  the  future  majority.  In  simple
terms,  the  policymaker  may  wish  to  borrow  in  excess  of  the  optimum,  and  let
his  successors  "pay  the  bills."  Thus,  political  instability  and  polarLza-
tion  lead  to  a form  of  collective  myopia,  even  if  the  policymaker  and  the19
voters  are  rational  and  forward  looking.
In  a  recent  paper,  Alesina  and  Tabellini  (1989)  have  developed  a
variant  of  this  model  for  the  case  of  developing  countries.  They  consider
an  economy  wit'i  two  groups  of  agents  identified  by  their  proluctive  role:
"workers"  (wage  earners)  and  "capitalists"  (owners  of  physical  capital  and
profit  earners).  The  two  groups  have  their  own  political  representatives
("parties")  that  alternate  in  office.  Each  party,  when  in  office,  attempts
to  redistribute  income  in  favor  of  its  constituency.  With  political  uncer-
tainty  (i.e.,  with  uncertainty  about  the  identity  of  future  governments),
the  government  in  office  finds  it  optimal  to  issue  debt. This  occurs
because  the  current  government  does  not  fully  internalize  the  future  costs
of  servicing  the  debt. The  government  that  borrows  (say  the  capitalist  one)
also  controls  how  the  proceeds  of  the  debt  issue  are  allocated:  they  are
transferred  to  the  capitalist  constituiency.  However,  if  there  is  a  change
of  government,  and  the  "workers"  take  over  the  government,  they  will  have  to
pay  this  debt  by  reducing  the  transferL.  to  their  constituency  (wage  earn-
ers). The  most  important  implication  of  this  setup  is  that,  since  borrowing
costs  are  not  internalized,  the  government  in  office  overoorrows.1 6
The  idea  that  political  alternation  among  groups  with  different
preferences  and  ideologies  induces  the  government  to  choose  strategically
the  time  path  of  a  state  variable,  has  several  other  applications  yet  to  be
investigated  (such  as  to  the  choice  of  capital  versus  current  public  spend-
16Alesina  and  Tabellini  (1990),  in  a  more  general  setting,  show  that
this  result  extends  to  the  case  in  which  current  and  future  governments
disagree  about  the  composition  of  spending  (rather  than  the  distribution  of
income).  And  Tabellini  and  Alesina  (1990)  show  that  the  results  go  through
even  if  the  policies  are  chosen  directly  by  the  voters  (rather  than  by  the
party  in  office),  provided  that  current  majorities  are  uncertain  about  the
identity  and  preferences  on  future  majorities.20
ing,  or the  choice  of investment  in legal  and  social  infrastructures).
Moreover,  the  existing  theoretical  research  on this subject  has  very sharp
testable  implications.  We now ask  whether  the  evidence  is consistent  with
these  implications.
In Tables  6A and  6B we include  two sets  of cross-country  regressions.
The dependent  variables  are the  two  measures  of  budget  deficit  reported  in
Table  4A:  (1)  change  in the  moneta-y  system's  credit  to the  government  (as
a percentage  of GDP);  and  (2)  the  deficit  of the  central  government  as
percent  of GDP.  The explanatory  variables,  on the  other  hand,  are:  (i)
indicators  of the structure  of the  economy  and  (ii) alternative  measures
of political  instability. The structural  variables  are the  same  used in the
analysis  of seignorage  reported  above,  namely,  per capita  income,  the  share
of agriculture  in total  output,  the  share  of exports  pl.us  imports  in total
output,  and  the  degree  of  urbanization  (averaged  over the  relevant  time  per-
iods). With respect  to  political  instability,  we tried,  as in the  results
reported  previously,  alternative  variables. Table  6A uses the  actual
frequency  of government  change  (lumping  together  coups  and  regular  govern-
ment transfers),  while  Table  6B distinguishes  between  the frequency  of coups
and  of regular  government  transfers. As pointed  out  previously,  our  view is
that  coups  are associated  with  more radical  changes  in the  nature  and
ideological  preferences  of the  government,  and thus  they should  have a
stronger  positive  impact  on the  budget  deficit.
We see from these  tables  that  our  measure  of political  instability  is
generally  positively  related  to  budget  deficits: its  estimated  coefficient
is almost  always  positive,  and in some (but  not all  of them)  it is signifi-
cant.  As expected,  coups  and  regular  government  changes  have different
coefficients  and, again  as expected,  coups  generally  have larger  estimated21
coefficients.
To  assess  the  robustness  of  these  estimates  we  added  a set  of  dummy
variables  that  grouped  countries  into  different  geographical  regions:  Asia,
Africa  and  Latin  America.  These  dummy  variables  were  generally  insignificant
and  the  remaining  coefficients  were  not affected. Finally,  as in  the
regressions  on  trade  taxes  reported  in  Table  3  above,  we  also  tried  other
measures  of  political  instability,  constructed  along  the  lines  of  CET  (1989).
The  results  were  very  similar  to  those  reported  in  Tables  6A  and  6B. These
results  provide  some  suggestive  preliminary  evidence  supporting  the  view  that
are  politically  more  unstable  tend  to  have  larger  budget  deficits.
It  may  be  argued  that  a  possible  problem  with  this  evidence  is  the
presence  of  reverse  causation,  and  that  budget  deficits  lead  to  instability,
rather  than  vice  versa. This  is  unlikely.  Instability  is  a  deep-rooted
feature  of  a  political  system,  that  generally  reflects  institutional  and
sociological  factors,  and  is  generally  not  affected  by  short  term  economic
performance  of  a  government.  Moreover,  the  same  results  reported  in  Tables
6A  and  6B  hold  when  we  measure  political  instability  as  the  frequency  of
government  change  from  1950  up  to  the  end  of  each  of  the  periods  reported  in
Table  6A  (rather  than  just  the  frequency  of  government  change  in  each  of
those  time  intervals). 17
Although  the  results  reported  in  Tables  6A  and  6B  are  encouraging,  they
are  not  as  positive  as  those  on  inflation  and  on  seignorage.  Moreover,  we
are  aware  that  they  leave  ample  room  for  improvements;  they  ought  to  be
regarded  as  preliminary  and  suggestive.  First,  as  already  mentioned,  our
17Moreover,  instrumental  variables  estimates  in  Cukierman,  Edwards  and
Tabellini  (1989)  show  that  the  results  on  the  role  of  political  stability  on
the  inflation  tax  hold  after  correcting  for  (potential)  reversed  causation.22
measures  of  budget  deficit  contain  measurement  error. Second,  it  is  not
unlikely  that  we  have  omitted  some  relevant  economic  variables  that  way
influence  a  country  decision  of  how  much  to  borrow.  Finally,  our  measures
of  political  polarization  are  not  fully  reliable;  and  yet,  according  to  tho
theory,  political  instability  matters  more  in  m:re  polarized  countries.  Of
course,  all  of  this  indicates  that  the  next  steps  in  this  research  program
should  be  aimed  at  trying  to  solve  these  problems.  In  spite  of  this,
however,  we  think  that  these  results,  together  with  those  on  inflation  and
seignorage  reported  in  the  previous  section,  clearly  show  that  it  is
possible  to  implement  serious  tests  on  the  main  implications  of  political
economy  models  of  macroeconomic  policies.  Moreover,  the  preliminary
evidence  is  largely  supportive  of  these  models.
XV.  Stabllization  Atteots.  Deauation,  and  EPoLlt
Historically,  cross-country  differences  in  fiscal  behavior  have  not
only  been  present  in  long  term  trends,  but  also  during  macroeconomic
adjustment  programs,  such  as  stabilization  attempts  and  devaluations.  A  key
question  that  has  long  haunted  macroeconomists  is  what  determines  the  degree
of  success  of  these  adjustment  programs.  Why  are  some  stabilizations  and
adjustment  devaluations  able  to  achieve  thelr  goals,  while  others  fail  so
miserably? This  question  is also  related  to the  political  economy  of
macroeconomic  policy.
It  is  well  known  that  in  order  for  a  nominal  devaluation  to  be
successful  --  in  the  sense  of  generating  a  rmAl  exchange  adjustment  and,
thus,  positively  affecting  the  external  sector  --  it  is  necessary  to
supplement  it  with  restrictive  fiscal  and  credit  policies.  However,  a
number  of  countries  that  embark  on  an  adjustment  program  OM devaluation23
fail  to  implement  the  required  restrictive  tiscal  corrections.  In  these
cases  instead  of  achieving  external  sector  equilibrium,  the  country  will
tend  to  move  towards  more  severe  macroeconomic  imbalance,  higher  inflation
and  a  more  serious  balance  of  payments  crisis.
An important  element  in  trying  to  understand  why  some  stabilization
programs  (including  their  devaluation  component)  succeed  while  others  fail,
is  understanding  the  fundamental  asymmetry  between  inflation  and  borrowinW,
on  the  one  hand,  and  other  fiscal  policy  actions,  such  as  reducing  expendi-
ture  and  increasing  taxes.  Printing  money  and  issuing  government  debt  are
generally  administrative  decisions  that  can  be  taken  in  a (relatively)
arbitrary  fashion;  raising  taxes  or  cutting  spending,  on  the  contrary,  are
usually  policy  decisions  that  require  a  political  consensus.  A government
who is  unable  for  political  reasons  to  balance  the  budget,  may still  be able
to  print  money. This  suggests  that  failed  devaluations  and  stabilizations
may  reflect  tne  inability  to  make  a  collective  decision  to  change  the  i
macroeconomic  status  quo  (as  opposed  to  being  the  result  of  a  deliberate
policy  decision). In  other  words,  a faLled  devaluation  may simply  be due to
a  political  deadlock  that  precludes  the  government  from  undertaking  those
fiscal  policy  actions  required  to assure  its  success.
This  line  of  thought  may  explain  why  in  many  developing  countries
inflation  and  government  borrowing  are  often  residual  sources  of  government
funds,  and  why  implementing  a  successful  stabilizations  and  devaluations  may
be  so  difficult.  When  the  resolution  of  political  conflict  is  difficult,
inflation  and  government  deficit  may  be  the  only  way  out,  if  no  political
consensus  can  be reached  on other  policy  decisions.  In this  section  we
briefly  discuss  two  possible  theoretical  avenues  for  formalizing  this  view
--  decentralized  policymaking  and  bargaining  and  coalitions  --  and  we24
provide  empirical  evidence  that  supports  the  hypothesis  that  stabilizations
attempts  typically  fail  in  countries  that  exhibit  high  political
instability.
A first  promising  approach  for  understanding  the  sources  of  failed
stabilizations  and  devaluations  is  based  on  the  policy  consequences  of
decentralized  gglievmakinf.  A feature  of  several  developing  countries  is
that  their  fiscal  policy  decision  process  is decentralized  amongst  several
decision  units: local  governments,  public  corporations,  and  different  parts
of  the  central  government  de  facto  have  some  spending  authority.  This
decentralized  process  can  lead  to  decisions  that  are  mutually  incompatible
and  against  the  collective  interest.  Inflation  and  deficits  may  be the  only
way  to  restore  compatibility.
Within  this  setting,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  the  decentralization  of
the  decisionmaking  process  results  in  overspending  in  the  local  public
goods.  Intuitively,  each  individual  realizes  that  the  cost  of  financing  its
good  falls  on  the  rest  of  the  community,  and  that  he  pays  only  a fraction
1/N of  this  cost  where N  is  the  number  of  individuals  in  this  country.
Hence,  he  does  not  fully  internalize  the  costs  of  spending  in  this  type  of
good. The  result  is  too  much  public  spending  and  too  little  private
consumption,  the  more  so  the  larger  is  the  number  of  "decentralized"  policy-
makers.  Intuitively,  decentralization  of  the  fiscal  policy  decision
process  leads  to  excessive  government  spending.  19
18A second  useful  analytical  approach  for  understanding  the  outcome  of
stabilization  programs  is  based  on  models  of  bargaining  and  coalition
formation.
19A  version  of  this  simple  ldea  has  been  applied  by  Weingast  et  al.
(1979)  to  explain  the  size  of  government  in  industrial  societies.  Aizenman
(1990)  explolts  it  to  explain  the  excessive  use  of  the  inflation  tax. San-
guinett'  (1990)  adds  to  a  similar  framework  an  optimizing  and  'benevolent"25
Models  of  bargalning  and  coalition  formation  provide  a  second  natural
avenue  for  the  analysis  of  how political  pressures  influence  fiscal  policy  in
developing  countries.  Consider  a  gove,oment,  or  a  legislature,  or  a  cabinet
who  has  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  undertake  some  unpopular  policy  action,
such  as  introducing  some  spending  cuts,  or  raising  some  taxes  to  supplement  a
devaluation.  The  groups  negatively  affected  by this  policy  action  have  the
option  to  use  "voice",  in  the  sense  of  Hirschman  (1970),  as  a  protest  against
the  government  decision.  Suppose  further  that  "voice"  actions  hurt  the
government  (for  instance,  because  they  inflict  losses  on  other  groups  of  the
population,  or  because  they  lead  to  a  loss  of  economic  resources  for  society
as a  whole). Then  we have  a bargaining  situation,  similar  to a "war  of
attrition",  where  the  bargaining  power  of  the  government  and  of  the  opposing
social  groups  determines  whether  the  unpopular  policy  is  implemented,  or
whether  it  is  interrupted,  or  whether  protests  occur.0
This  general  framework  can  be  applied  to  several  economic  or  political
situations,  including  the  determinants  of the  degree  of success  of a  stabill-
zation  program,  or  a  nominal  devaluation  adjustment.  It  can  also  be  used  to
explain  why  a  government  prolongs  an  unsustainable  fiscal  regime  despite  its
commitment  to  fixed  exchange  rates  or,  even  when  it  is  clear  that  a  fiscal
adjustment  is required  for  a devaluation  to  become  successful. This line  of
federal  government  that  decides  on  the  profile  of  a  federal  tax. He  shows
that  in  the  non-cooperative  equilibri.m,  the  government  spends  more  than  if
there  is  cooperation  among  the  federal  and  local  fiscal  authorities.
20Alesina  and  Drazen  (1990)  study  a  model  of  this  kind,  along  the  lines
pioneered  by  Bliss  and  Nalebuff  (1986).  In  the  Alesira-Drazen  paper,  the
decision  to  stabilize  requires  the  consent  of  two  rival  groups  of  citizens.
The two  groups  are  engaged  in a  war of attrition: the first  one to give in
bears  a  disproportionate  burden  of  the  stabilization.  In  equilibrium,  both
groups  refrain  from  accepting  the  stabilization  right  away. As  a result,
the  stabilization  is  delayed,  even  though  such  a  delay  is  inefficient  for
society  as a whole.26
research  is indirectly  supported  by several  empirical  findings. For  example,
Berg and Sachs  (1988)  find that  debt repayment  difficulties  are  more
pronounced  in countries  where  the  political  conflict  is  more polarized. 21
The  above  discussion  suggests  a number  of avenues  for  empirically
analyzing  the  role  of political  consider.ations  in the  outcome  of devaluation
episodes. Our central  proposition  is that  governments  that  are politically
stronger  will generally  find  it easier  to implement  the  fiscal  adjustment
required  as a supplement  to  a successful  devaluation. A first  specific  test
is to inquire - using  non-parametric  methods,  for  example  --  whether
devaluations  indeed  tend  to fail  in those  countries  with  more unstable  and
polarized  political  environment. A second  test  would  be to investigate  the
timing  of devaluation  episodes. Since,  in  democratic  regimes  governments
are  usually  stronger  at the  beginning  of their  administration,  we would
expect  to find  most  devaluation  attempts  taking  place  in the  early  years  of
a  government's  tenure  in  office. A third  potentiel  test  is related  to the
idea  of decentralization  and  policy  coordination. In general,  we would
expect  that in those  nations  with more  decentralized  (and  more polarized)
political  systems,  it  would  be more  difficult  to implement  the fiscal
21Similar  casual  evidence  is provided  by Dornbusch  (1987). Both
studies  hence  support  the  idea  that  changing  the status  quo and implementing
unpopular  policy  decisions  is  more difficult  in  more  polarized  and  divided
countries. This is indeed  an implication  of the  Alesina  and Drazen  (1989)
theoretical  model.  Perhaps  even  more to the  point,  Roubini  and  Sachs (1988)
find that  different  industrial  countries  have  had  very different  fiscal
responses  to  adverse  economic  shocks. The  countries  that  have relied  on
government  borrowing  to  a greater  eAcent  are  typically  led  by unstable
coalition  governments. Roubini  and  Sachs  (1988)  interpret  this finding  as
evidence  that fiscal  deficits  and lack  of fiscal  discipline  reflect  a
country's  inability  to  change  the  status  quo  in the  face  of adverse  economic
circumstances. This inability  is  more  pronounced  in  political  systems
fractionalized  among  many small  parties,  in  which  coalitions  are fragile  and
each  coalition  member  has a  veto power  but  no capacity  to impose  its  will on
the  political  majority.27
adjustment  required  by  a  successful  devaluation.  In  the  subsection  that
follows  we  use  data  on  39  devaluation  episodes  to  implement  the  first  two
tests  described  here. 22
IV.l The  Politics  of  Successful  DevaluAtion  Prozrams:  Some  Preliminar
EmDirical  Evidec
The  purpose  of  this  subsection  is  to  use  a  cross  country  data  set  to
investigate  the  extent  to  which  political  considerations  determine  the
degree  of  success  of  39  devaluation  programs.
IV.1.lTh  QASJbaL_iE
The  data  set  on  devaluations  used  in  *ur  empirical  investigation
corresponds  to  that  assembled  by  Edwards  (1989)  in  his  study  on  real
exchange  rates  in  developing  countries.  The  episodes  are  listed  in  Table  7,
and  have  been  classified  into  a  group  (Panel  A)  of  countries  that  imple-
mented  a stepwise  devaluation  and  a  group  (Panel  B) that  adopted  a crawling
peg  after  devaluing.  As  can  be  seen  all  devaluations  are  substantial  --  of
at  least  15  percent.
The  stated  objective  of  these  devaluations,  and  their  accompanying
packages,  was  to  help  solve  the  external  crises  in  these  countries  by
reversing  the  real  exchange  rate  overvaluation  --  that  is,  by  generating  a
real  exchange  rate depreciation  --  improving  the  current  account  and
improving  the  net foreign  position.  Edwards  analyzed  the  degree  of
econgomi  success  of  these  devaluations  using  a two  step  procedure.  First,
he  analyzed  the  evolution  of  a  set  of  external  sector  indicators  --  the  real
exchange  rate,  the  current  account,  and the  net  foreign  asset  position  --  in
22We  don't  attempt,  however,  to  directly  test  the  decentralization
hypothesis.
23These  are  in  fact  the  stated  objectives  of  the  IMF  programs  that  were
associated  with  most  of  these  devaluations.28
the  period  following  the  devaluations.  The  second  step  consisted  of  analy-
zing  the  behavior  of  a  group  of  macroeconomic  indicators. 24.
In  classifying  these  episodes  in  successful  and  unsuccessful  Edwards
concentrated  on  the  behavior  of  three  key  indicators  during  the  period
following  the  devaluations:  (1) Real  exchange  rates.  The  focus  here  was
on  the  behavior  of  an  effectiveness  index  defined  as  the  ex-post  real
exchange  rate  elasticity  of  nominal  devaluations;  (2) behavior  of  net
foreign  assets  of  the  monetary  system;  and  (3) behavior  of  the  current
account  ratio.  Given  the  difficulties  associated  with  classifying  in  a
clear  cut  fashion  some  of  these  episodes  as  successful  or  unsuccessful,  a
three  way  classification  was  used: (1) successful  episodes;  (2) unsuc-
cessful  episodes;  (3) devaluations  with  a  limited  degree  of  success.  25
24Although  this  approach  is  highly  revealing  it  does  have  some
problems,  including  the  fact  that  other  variables  are  not  kept  constant.
For  a  discussion  of  the  methodological  limitations  of  this  approach  see
Edwards  (1989c).
251n  order  for  an  episode  to  qualify  as  sgccessful  the  following  two
conditions  had  to  be  met: (1) three  years  after  the  devaluation  the
effectiveness  index  had  to  exceed  0.3;  &4  (2) three  years  after  the
devaluation  either  the  current  account  or  net  foreign  assets  indicators  had
to  exhibit  an  improvement  relative  to  the  year  before  the  crisis.  The  first
requirement  implies  that  in  order  for  an  episode  to  be  classified  as
successful  no  more  than  70%  of  the  devaluation  impact  on  the  teal  exchange
rate  has  to  be  eroded  in  three  years.  The  second  requirement  means  that  a
real  depreciation  nerLse  is  not  enough  for  the  nominal  devaluation  to  be
considered  a  success;  in  addition,  the  external  sector  accounts  had  to  be
improved.  An  episode  was  defined  as  msmg.caLu2fl  if  three  years  after  the
devaluation  the  real  exchange  rate  was  below  its  value  the  year  before  the
crisis  --  that  is,  the  effectiveness  index  was  negative  --  or  If  even  when
the  effectiveness  index  was  posltive  (but  still  below  0.3)  both  the  net
foreign  assets  &Da current  account  positions  had  worsened  1  &nd 3 years
after  the  devaluation.  These  definitions  of  success  and  failure  are  quite
strict  and  are  able  to  sharply  discriminate  between  countries.  A  number  of
episodes,  however,  sit  in  between  these  two  extreme  groups.  We  have  called
them  limited-success  episodes,  since  in  most  of  them  we  observe  some
improvement  in  the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and/or  the  external
sector  accounts.29
Table  8  contains  Edwards'  39  episodes  classified  according  to  this
criterion.  As  can  be  seen,  among  the  29  stepwise  devaluers,  there  are  13
clearcut  successful  cases,  9  clearcut  failures  and  7  limited-success  cases.
For  the  10  crawlers  there  are  three  successful  episodes,  five  unsuccessful
ones  and  two  cases  of  limited  success.  The  13  successful  stepwise  devaluers
(Panel  A.1  of  Table  7)  were  able  to  sustain  substantial  real  depreciations
in  the  medium  term. The  average  for  the  effectiveness  Lndex  after  3  years
is  0.66  indicating  that  on  average  2/3  of  these  nominal  devaluations  had
been  transmitted  into  a  real  devaluation.  For  these  13  countries  as  a
group,  3  years  after  the  crisis  the  RER  stood  on average  66% higher  than its
value  immediately  before  the  devaluations.  For  the  9  stepwise  cases  with
limited  success  (Panel  A.2  in  Table  7)  the  average  value  of  the  effective-
ness  index  is  still  an  impressive  0.49. On  the  whole,  then,  this  evidence
strongly  shows  that  for  a large  number  of  cases  nominal  devaluations  have
been  helpful  in  generating  real  exchange  rate  realignments.
For  the  9  unsuccessful  stepwise  episodes,  on  the  other  hand,  the  index
of  devaluation  effectiveness  had  an  average  of  -0.21  three  years  after  the
crisis,  indicating  that  at  that  time  the  RER was  more  then  20%  ba1l its
value  immediately  prior  to  the  crisis.  For  these  cases  devaluations  not
only  failed  to  generate  a real  exchange  realignment,  but  even  worse,  three
years  after  the  event  the  magnitude  of  the  external  disequilibrium  had
greatly  increased.  In  fact,  for  tbese  countries  in  the  three  years
following  the  devaluation  the  net  foreign  assets  ratio  declined  on  average
by  more  than  10%.
Discriminant  analy_is  was  used  to  test  whether  it  was  possible  to
statistically  discriminate  among  successful  and  unsuccessful  groups  based  on
the  behavior  of  macroeconomic  variables  only. The  two  gro4ups  of  countries30
pursued  macroeconomic  policies  (domestic  credit  and  fiscal  policies)  that
were significantly  different  from  a statistical  point  of  view.  In fact,  the
results  obtained  from the  discriminant  analysis  were quite  striking,
indicating  that  by and large  it  was possible  to statistically  discriminate
between  these  two  groups  on the  basis  of their  Dacrgeconomic  nolicies  only.
According  to these  results,  three  years  after  the  devaluation  only  one
country  which  was classified  as successful  in Table  8  did not  belong  to that
group:  Egypt  1979.  The posterior  probability  of it  belonging  to the
successful  group  was  only 2%.  These  results,  then,  confirm  the  existence  of
a strong  and  statistically  significant  relation  between  macroeconomic  (and
especially  fiscal)  policies  and successful  stepwise  devaluations. The
question  that  remains  to  be answered  is  why some  countries  were able to
indeed  implement  corrective  fiscal  policies  alongside  devaluations  and
others  weren't. As argued  in the  preceding  discussion,  our  answer  is that
this  has to do with the  political  economy  of fiscal  policy.  In the  rest of
this  section  we turn to the  empirical  analysis  of this  hypothesis. In doing
this  Edwards  grouped  the  successful  and limited  success  countries  into  a
broad  success  group.
IV.1.2 The Timing  of Devaluatlins
An important  empirical  implication  of the  approach  to stabilization
discussed  above  is that governments  will tend  to implement  adjustment
policies  --  including  major  devaluations  --  earlier  in  their tenure  in
office. The reason  for  this is that  at this time  governments  in  democratic
regimes  are usually  politically  stronger  than  later  in their  period. We
analyzed  this  implication  of the  theory  by investigating  the  timing  of the
devaluations  in each country. Two indicators  were constructed: (1)  number
of years  elapsed  between  the last  government  change  and the  devaluation,  and31
(2) number  of  years  between  the  devaluation  and  the  next  government  change.
Additionally  countries  were  classified  according  to  their  political  regime
into  three  groups:  presidential  democracies,  where  the  date  of  the  election
is  predetermined;  parliamentary  democracies  and  dictatorial  rule. Classify-
ing  some  of  these  countries  into  a  political  regime  is  not  completely
straightforward.  Two  particularly  difficult  cases  refer  to  Egypt  under
Nassar  and  Cyprus  under  Makarios,  where  the  leaders  term  was  extended  beyond
what  was  considered  'normal".  Both  cases,  however,  were  labelled  as
democratic  presidential  regimes.
Table  9  contains  summary  statistics  for  the  timing  of  these  39
devaluations  episodes.  This  information  is  quite  impressive,  showing  that,
as  was  expected  from  the  discussion,  in democratic  regimes  devaluations
indeed  tend  to  take  place  during  the  early  years  of  each  administration;
very  few  devaluation  attempts  have  indeed  taken  place  during  the  last  few
years. An  additional  interesting  piece  of  information  in  this  table  is  that
there  is  no  evidence  that  dictatorships  front-load  their  devaluations.
IV.1.3 Polical  Determinants  of  Successfu  Devaluations
The  most  important  empirical  implication  of  our  previous  discussion  is
that  countries  with  a  weaker,  more  unstable  and  polarized  political
environment  will  generally  have  greater  difficulties  in  implementing  the
fiscal  adjustment  required  for  a  devaluation  to  be  successful.  This
suggests  that  it  should  be  possible  to  "predict"  the  degree  of  success  of  a
devaluation  through  the  use of  political  variables  only.  This is indeed
what  we  do  in  this  section  through  the  implementation  of  a  series  of
discriminant  analyses  on  our  39  devaluation  episodes.
We  used  the  Jodice  and  Taylor  data  set  to  define  three  groups  of
political  indicators  for  the  different  devaluation  episodes.  The  first  set32
captures  the  historical  political  environment  of the  countries  previous  to
the  devaluation. It  measures  a number  of  variables,  such  as political  riots,
successful  coups  and  the  like,  from  1948 (the  first  year in the  data  set) to
the  year prior  to the  devaluation. The second  and  third  sets  of indicators
deal  with the  political  environment  in the  period  immediately  following  the
devaluation. They  measure  the  same  political  indicators  one  year after  the
devaluation  and for  the  three  year  period  following  the  devaluation.
Ten  variables  in each  of these  sets  of indicators  for  measuring  the
degree  of political  instability  were actually  used:
(1)  politically  motivated  attacks;
(2)  politically  related  deaths;
(3)  successful  coups  attempts;
(4)  politically  motivated  strikes;
(5)  political  demonstrations  and  riots;
(6)  politically  motivated  assassinations;
(7)  frequency  of government  transfers,  either  regular  or  unscheduled  (via
coups);
(8)  an overall  measure  of violence  defined  as the frequency  of protests,
strikes,  deaths,  assassination  attempts  and  attacks;
(9)  frequency  of unsuccessful  government  transfers,  including  unsuccessful
coups;
(10) frequency  of political  repression  computed  as the  number  of related
executions  plus  political  sanctions  imposed  by the  government  on its
opponents.
In order  to correct  by country  size,  those  variables  were defined  in  per
capita  terms. Table  10 contains  some  summary  statistics  for  our last  four
indicators  --  frequency  of government  change,  violence  index,  unsuccessful33
transfers  and  repression  index.  Additionally,  in  order  to  shed  additional
light  on  these  data  we  have  added  the  frequency  of  successful  coups.
Once  these  data  sets  were  assembled  we  proceeded  in  the  following  way:
we  selected  subsets  of  these  political  indicators  to  test  whether  we  could
discriminate  between  successful  and  unsuccessful  devaluations  on  the  basis
of  the  political  environment  only. The  results  obtained  were  very
encouraging,  showing  that  in  most  cases  by  using  political  variables  we
could  classify  most  devaluation  episodes  correctly.  In  what  follows  we
provide  a detailed  discussion  of  2  of  these  exercises
DISCRIMINANT  ANALYSIS  1: The  purpose  of  this  exercise  was  to  classify  the
devaluation  episodes  into  three  groups:  successful  devaluations,  limited
success  and  unsuccessful  devaluations.  In  this  first  discriminant  analysis
we  used  the  following  political  indicators:  successful  coups;  attacks;
assassinations,  deaths,  strikes  and  riots;  that  is,  we  used  variables  (1)
through  (6)  from  our  list. Each  of  them  was  defined  for  both  the  country's
political  history  as  well  as  for  the  3  year  period  following  the  devalua-
tion. As  can  be  seen  from  Table  11,  only  2  of  the  39  devaluations  episodes
were  misclassified:  Jamaica  1967  and  Kenya.  According  to  the  economic
classification  criterion  summarized  in  Table  7  both  of  these  devaluations
were  of  limited  success.  However,  according  to  the  political  indicators
criterion  they  were  classified  as  successful.  The  posterior  probability  of
these  episodes  belonging  to  the  successful  devaluation  group  were  0.63  for
Jamaica  and  0.91  for  Kenya.
Overall,  these  results  are  extremely  supportive  of  our  contention  that
the  political  environment  is  clearly  related  to  the  degree  of  success  of
adjustment  and  devaluation  episodes:  only  2  episodes  out  of  39  appear  to  be
risclassified.  However,  a  possible  problem  with  these  results  Is  that  the34
discriminant  analysis  incorporates  too  many  variables  (12)  for  purposes  of
classification.  More  specifically,  it  is  possible  to  think  that  by
incorporating  the  political  indexes  for  the  period  of  3  years  following  the
devaluation  we  are  providing  "too  much"  information.  In  order  to
investigate  how  the  results  were  affected  by  these  considerations  we  also
undertook  discriminant  analyses  using  separately  the  historical  political
variables,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  post-devaluation  indexes  on  the  other.
When  historical  variables  only  were  used  the  results  were  still  very
supportive  of  the  theory:  only  five  of  the  episodes  were  misclassified.
One  of  the  episodes  classified  as  successful  on  economic  grounds  (Chile)  is
classified  as  "limited  success"  on  political  grounds;  another  3  economically
successful  (Ecuador  1979,  Colombia  1967,  and  Egypt  1970)  devaluations  are
misclassified  as  unsuccessful  when  the  political  criterion  is  used;  finally
one  of  the  episodes  classified  as  unsuccessful  on  economic  grounds  (Israel,
1971)  is  misclassified  as  having  had  limited  success  when  the  political
criteria  is  used.  All in all,  however,  the  results  are still  remarkable
with  only  12.8%  of  the  episodes  being  misclassified. 26
DISCRIMINANT  ANALYSIS  2:  In  this  exercise  we  used  indicators  on  frequency
of  government  change,  overall  violence,  unsuccessful  transfer  attempts  and
political  executions  (variable  (7)  through  (10)  in  our  list). In  the
initial  analysis  we  used  these  indicators  for  all  three  time  periods:
historical,  for  one  year  after  and  three  years  after  the  devaluation.  When
this  was  done,  all  39  episodes  were  classified  correctlyl  In  order  to  check
for  the  robustness  of  these  results,  we  also  performed  a  discriminant  test
26When  instead  of  using  the  hs.tgriAlc  politLcal  variables  only,  we
restricted  the  analysis  to  the  post  (3  years)  devaluation  indicators,  the
results  were  similar:  only  5 (different)  episodes  were  misclassified.35
where these  four  political  indicators  were  defined  for  the  historical  period
and  for the  three  years  after  the  devaluation. The results  obtained  in this
case are  reported  in Table  12.  As can  be seen they  are still  remarkably
strong,  with only 6 episodes  out of 39  being  misclassified.
It  may be argued  that  the  classification  of the 39  episodes  into  three
groups  (successful,  limited  success  and  unsuccessful)  reported  in Table  7 is
somewhat  arbitrary. In order  to  determine  whether  this  three-way  classific-
ation  indeed  affected  our  analysis,  we reclassified  the  devaluation  episodes
into  two  groups: successful  --  which  now  pulls  together  the  previous
successful  and limited  success  groups  --  and  unsuccessful. The rationale
behind  this is that  there  are  at least  some  grounds  for  arguing  that in the
so-called  "limited  success  episodes'  some  of the  objectives  of the  devalua-
tion  programs  were accomplished. When  our discriminant  analysis  No. 1  was
redone  for  this  two-way  classification  of the  degree  of success  of the
devaluations  the  results  were even  more favorable  than  before:  now every
episode  is  classified  correctly. When other  groups  of -'ariables  were used
in two-way  classification  discriminant  analyses,  the  results  were also  very
satisfactory;  in  most cases  every  episode  was correctly  classified.
To summarize,  then,  the  discriminant  analyses  reported  here indicate,
in  a  substantive  way, that  as the  political  economy  approach  predicts,  there
is a close  relationship  between  political  instability  and  the ability  to
undertake  painful  stabilization  ad,astment.
V.  0oncima  rks
There  are  very large  differences  in the  monetary  and fiscal  policies
implemented  by different  countries  or in the  same  country  at different
points  in time.  In this  paper  we have asked  how can these  differences  be36
explained? In the  previous  pages  we argued  that this  is one  of the  central
questions  to be addressed  by the  theory  of economic  policy,  and  we suggested
that  an answer  can  be found  by focusing  on the  incentive  constraints  faced
by the  policymakers. In  particular,  we emphasized  credibility  constraints
and  various  political  incentives. Our  empirical  findings  are very support-
ive  of this line  of research. In  our sample  of developing  countries,
inflation  and  budget  deficits  are  systematically  related  to political
variables,  and in  particular  to different  measures  of political  instability.
Moreover,  our  empirical  analysis  clearly  suggests  that the  degree  of success
of stabiliza-icn  and  devaluation  programs  is  closely  related  to the
polit 4 iA.  -. 1 institutional  framework  in specific  countries.
The the.:uical models  reviewed  and formulated  in this  paper offer  at
least  three  different  hypotheses  of  how political  instability  and  more
generally  political  institutions  influence  the  policy  formation  process.
First,  political  instability  and  polarization  determines  the  strength  of
reputational  incentives,  and  hence  ultimately  the  government  credibility.
Second,  political  instability  determines  the  rate  of  time  preference  of
sooziety  as a  whole,  and  hence  matters  for  any collective  intertemporal
decision, Third,  political  institutions  and in  particular  the  degree  of
political  cohesion  influences  a society's  capacity  to  make decisions  and to
change  the  status  quo in the  face  of adverse  economic  circumstances. As the
empirical  results  reported  in this  paper indicate,  some of the  most
important  implications  of models  based  on these  three  hypotheses  cannot  be
rejected. Thus,  discriminating  among  them,  and  assessing  their  relative
importance  in  concrete  instances  1i an important  task  of future  research.
The results  reported  in this  paper  provide  some important  policy
implications  that  can  be exploited  to  advantage  in the  design  of adjustment37
and  stabilization  programs.  More  specifically,  according  to  these  results
inseitutional.  reforms  that  reduce  government's  ability  to  engage  in  discre-
tionary  unexpected  policies  will  increase  their  credibility  and,  thus,  will
tend  to  reduce  political  instability  and  the  equilibrium  level  of  inflation.
Our  results  also  indicate  that  reforms  that  take  away  from  government's  hand
money  creation,  and  thus  the  possibility  of  using  the  inflation  tax  as  a
residual  source  of  funds,  will  reduce  the  reliance  on  seignorage  ard
inflation.  At  a  more  general  level,  these  results  indicate  that  any  reform
that  limits  government's  ability  to  behave  strategically  in  an  intertemporal
sense,  will  increase  macroeconomic  stability,  reduce  inflation  and  result  in
lower  deficits  and  domestic  debt. In  that  regard  a  particularly  important
reform  is  the  creation  of  an  independent  Central  Banks  that  cannot  be
manipulated  at  will  by  the  party  in  office.  The  recent  (late  1989)  Chilean
and  New Zealand  experiences  in  this  direction  are,  in  fact,  promising  and
are  likely  to  be  an  important  material  for  analysis  in  the  years  to  come.
From  a  more  specific  political  angle  the  results  reported  in  this  paper
also  suggest  that  institutional  reforms  aimed  at  generating  reduced  polariz-
ation  and  lower  (perceived)  political  instability  will  tend  to  result  in  a
more  stable  macroeconomic  environment.  For  example,  it  may  be  argued  that
an  institutional  setting  with  a  reduced  number  of  political  parties
(although  not  necessarily  two)  will  in  general,  and  with  other  things  given,
tend  to  result  in  lower  deficits  and  inflation.  Also  policy  actions  tending
at  reducing  the  degree  of  polarization  - such  as,  for  example,  reducing  the
extent  of  income  inequality  or  the  level  of  poverty  --  are  likely  to  end  up
resulting  in  a  more  stable  macro  environment.
Finally,  and  at  a  more  practical  level,  these  results  can  also  be
interpreted  as  providing  empirical  support  for  World  Bank  conditionality.38
Indeed  to the  extent  that  the  Bank resources  are  only  made available  on the
condition  of some  policy  actions  being  undertaken,  governments  abilities  to
act  strategically  will  be reduced. It is  still  open,  however,  whether  the
current  style  of conditionality  is the  more appropriate  or if, in the light
of our results  regarding  the importance  of political  factors,  alternative
forms  of conditionality  should  be sought.39
APPENDIX  I
The  Theory  PE ORtIMMlTAxation:  Theory  and  Tests
An  important  question  is  whether  the  observed  pattern  of  the  inflation
tax  can  be  explained  as  the  optimal  government  response  to  a  politically
desired  path  of  public  spending.  The  modern  theory  of  public  finance  lends
some  support  to  this  point  of  view. Under  the  eminently  plausible  assump-
tions  of  tax  evasion,  and  administrative  tax  collection  costs  it  is  optimal
for  the  government  to  rely  (at  least  partially)  on  the  inflation  tax  (see,
for  example,  Aizenman  (1987)).27
Suppose  that  the  government  can  use  the  inflation  tax  (i)  and  other
tax  rates  on  output (r) to  finance  its  expenditures.  Both  taxes  are
distortionary  and  impose  a  welfare  cost  that  is  increasing  on  their  rate.
The  cost  of  the  output  tax  rate  is f(r) while  that  of  the  inflation  tax  is
h(ff).  Then  Mankiw  (1987)  shows  that  the  optimal  tax  policy  implies:
h'(wf  )  - kf'(r  )  (A.1)
where k  is  a  parameter  of  the  money  demand  function.  Thus,  at  the  optimum
the  marginal  cost  of each  tax  has to be equated  in every  period. This
implies  that  as  government  expenditure  changes,  inflation  and  non-inflation
taxes  move  together.  Mankiw  (1987)  tests  this  implication  using  U.S.  data
for  1951-82;  his  results  show  that  there  has  indeed  been  a  positive  rela-
tionship  between  inflation  and  the  tax  rate. Mankiw  interprets  this  finding
as  providing  support  for  the  theory  of  optimal  taxation  as  a positive  theory
of  policy  behavior.
27This  result  is  true  even  if  money  facilitates  the  process  of  exchanige
and  reduces  transaction  costs,  as  in  the  models  of  Faig  (1988)  and  Kimbrough
(1987),  so  that  money  essentially  acts  like  an  intermediate  input.40
More rocently  a  number  of authors  have extended  Mankiw's  work both
theoretically  and  empirically.  Vittorio  Grilli  (1989)  has  pointed  out  that
Mankiw's  tests  fail  to  exploit  a  number  of  important  implications  of  the
theory,  including  the  fact  that  seignorage  and  income  taxes  should  have  a
unit  root,  and  that  there  should  exist  cointegration  between  different
measures  of  government  revenue  and  between  revenues  and  expectations.  His
empirical  results  for  a  group  of  10  European  nations  are  mixed,  suggesting
that  while  in  some  countries  seignorage  has  behaved  as  piedicted  by  optimal
taxation  theory,  in  others  it  has  not  done  so. Grilli  also  extends  Mankiw's
work  by  allowing  the  possibility  of  a  variable  velocity  and  by  explicitly
incorporating  the  fact  that  fixed  exchange  rate  agreements  constraint  the
ability  to  use  seignorage.
Poterba  and  Rotemberg  (1990)  make  a  distinction  between  governments
that  can  commit  to  a  course  of  action  and  those  that  cannot  do  so. In  their
model,  in  the  commitment  case  inflation  and  taxes  will  be  positively  cor-
related,  while  in  the  absence  of  commitment  inflation  will  1..  a  positive
function  of  both  taxes  and  total  government  liabilities  as  a  percentage  of
GNP. They  estimate  both  versions  of  the  model,  using  OLS  and  instrumental
variables,  on time  series  data  for  five countries  --  France,  Germany,  Japan,
the  U.K.,  and  the  U.S.  --  and  conclude  that  the  evidence  does  not  provide  a
generalized  support  to  the  optimal  taxation  view  of  inflation.  As in  previ-
ous  cases  this  theory  only  seems  to  hold  for  the  case  of  the  United  States.
This  type  of  work  has  recently  been  criticized  on  two  different  counts.
On  the  one  hand,  Dornbusch  (1989)  has  pointed  out  that  while  the  theory  is
based  on Max&inal  tax  rates,  most  (if  not all)  empirical  tests  have  used
computed  avage  rrtes. On  the  other  hand,  Judd  (1990)  points  out  that  the
welfare  costs  of  the  inflation  tax  should  be  related  to  expected  inflation,41
rather  than  to  actual  inflation.  Thus,  according  to  the  theory  of  optimal
taxation,  tax  rates  and  expected  inflation  should  move  in  the  same  direc-
tion. Moreover,  any  innovation  in  government  spending  or  the  tax  bases
should  result  in  unexpected  changes  in  actual  inflation.  While  Judd's
distinction  between  expected  and  uwsexpected  inflation  is  important,  his
argument  that  only  expected  inflation  has  welfare  costs  is  not  generally
valid  (for  instance,  it  relies  on  the  government  neglecting  the  redistribu-
tions  within  the  private  sector  that  are  brought  about  by  unexpected
inflation  or  deflation).  We  return  to  this  point  below.
As  Grilli  (1989)  has  pointed  out,  a  necessary  (but  not  sufficient)
empirical  implication  of  the  optimal  taxation  theory  is  that  both  the
inflation  rate  and  the  tax  rate  should  have  a  unit  root.28  In  Tables  A.1
and  A.2  we  use  the  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  test  for  unit  roots  on
these  two variables  for  a large  number  of  developing  countries.  While  Table
A.1  presents  results  obtained  using  annual  data  for  kQgh inflation  and  tax
rates,  Table  5  presents  ADF  tests  on  quarterly  data  for  the  inflation  tax
rate  only. (There  are  no  quarterly  data  on  tax  rates.)29  As  can  be  seen
from  Table  A.1,  in  all  cases,  except  inflation  in  India,  the  unit  root
hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected.  The  results  in  Table  A.3  show  that,  as  in
the  case  of  Table  A.2,  for  the  vast  majority  of  the  countries  the  hypothesis
that  inflation  follows  a  unit  root  cannot  be  rejected.
28That  is,  their  time  series  should  have  the  following  form: xt  - xt1
+  ut, where ut  is  an  error  term.
29The  taxation  rate  is  computed,  as  In  Mankiw,  as  the  ratio  of
goverrnent  tax  revenues  to  GDP. The  raw  data  were  obtained  from  the  IMF
Government  Financial  Statistics.  While  Table  2  contains  data  for  those  21
countrles  with  data  on  both  f  and *, Table  3  presents  data  on  w  only
for  a larger  group  of  44  nations.42
However,  a unit  root is a necessary  but  not sufficient  condition  of the
optimal  taxation  theory. Indeed,  the  theory  says that  in order  to maintain
the  optimalty  condition  (1)  in the  presence  of shocks,  seignorage  should  be
positively  correlated  with the  rate  of the  income  tax.  To investigate  this
aspect  of the  optimal  taxation  theory  for  the  LDCs we estimated  a  Mankiw  type
regression  for  the  countries  in  Table  A.l.  The following  equation  was
estimated  on the  first  differences  of the  rate of inflation  and  the tax  rate:
AINFt  a0 +  1 ATAXt  +  et  (A.2)
where  INF  is the  yearly  rate of inflation  and  TAX is the (implicit)  yearly
rate  of tax  on output  computed,  as in  Table  A.1  and in Mankiw  (1987),  as the
ratio  of tax  revenues  to GDP.  If the  theory  of optimal  taxation  presented
above  is correct, a1  would  be significantly  positive. Moreover,  Mankiw
argues  that it  should  be roughly  one.30  The  results  obtained  from  running
these  regressions  using  both OLS  and instrumental  variables  are reported  in
Table  A.3.31 As can  be seen,  for  most countries,  t'h:qse  results  strongly
reject  the  hypothesis  that  there  is a  positive  relation  between  the  output
tax  rate  and the  inflation  tax  rate.  Other  preliminary  work not reported
here for  reasons  of space  indicates  that  at the  core of this  rejection  lies
a  striking  stylized  fact:  the inflation  tax  often  behaves  as a  residal
source  of government  revenue. It goes  up when spending  increases  or when
30Mankiw's  results  for  the  U.S. were (standard  deviations  in
parentheses). AINF  - -0.1  +  1.44  &TAX.  When the  change  in the  nominal
(0.4)  (0.49)
interest  rate  was  used instead  of  AINF  the  coefficient  of  ATAX  was much
closer  to  unity.
31Instrumental  variables  estimation  was used in order  to account  for
possible  endogeneity  of the  TAX  variable  as a  result  of the  Tanzi-Olivera
effect. When cointegration  tests  were  computed  the results  were Y=
similar  to those  obtained  from  the  regression  analysis,  rejecting  the
hypothesis  that  TAX and INF  moved  jointly  through  time.43
other  sources  of  revenue  fall. There  are  a  number  of  possible  explanations
for  these  results,  including  that  the  optimal  taxation  theory  does  not  apply
to  these  countries. 32
It  has  recently  been  argued  by  Judd  (1990)  that  one  possible  explanation
for  the  empirical  rejection  of  the  implications  of  the  theory  of  optimal
taxation  is  that  expected  inflation,  and  not  actual  inflation,  imposes
welfare  costs. In  this  case,  it  would  indeed  be  optimal  for  the  government
to  respond  to  innovations  to  government  spending  and  tax  bases  by  means  of
unexpected  inflation  and  deflation  (i.e.,  to  let  inflation  be  a  residual
source  of  government  revenue).  Judd,  in  fact,  has  argued  that  when  analyzing
inflation,  1.U  its  effects  on  government  revenues  (and  not  only  seigniorage)
should  be  considered.  More  specifically,  Judd  points  out  that  inflation
should  be  primarily  treated  as  a tax  on  a  stock  of  liabilities,  including
(especially)  the  government  debt.33  Judd  then  shows  that  if  money  demand  is
32For  example,  there  may  be  serious  measurement  problems;  alternatively
we  may  be  facing  a  two  way  causality  problem  stemming  from  the  presence  of  a
Tanzi  type  effect  where  inflation  reduces  the  effective  tax  rate. However,
the  fact  that  the  optimal  taxation  hypothesis  fails  for  countries  with  very
low  average  inflation  suggests  that  the  Tanzi  effect  is  not  very  important.
Also,  the  instrumental  variables  estimation  was  undertaken  in  order  to  elim-
inate  this  endogeneity  problem.  In  developing  more  complicated  versions  of
this  model  a  numbe-  of  institutional  characteristics  proper  of  the  LDCs
should  be  considered.  For  example,  one  ought  to  take  into  account  the  fact
that  often  domestic  capital  markets  are  not  well  developed.  Hence  most
public  borrowing  has  to  be  done  abroad,  using  external  debt. This
introduces  two  complications  that  may  change  the  nature  of  the  optimal
policy. First,  developing  countries  generally  face  credit  constraints  in
international  capital  markets.  Secondly,  to  the  extent  that  they  can  borrow
abroad,  they  can  only  borrow  in  foreign  currency;  this  means  that  external
debt  may  increase  exposure  to  exchange  rate  risk  or  terms  of  trade  risk.
Both  of  these  complications  presumably  weaken  the  tax  smoothing  principle,
since they  raise  the  cost  of issuing  public  debt.  However,  they  do not
alter  the  prescr:ption  that  the  inflation  rate  should  covary  positively  with
other  tax  rates.
33Judd  correctly  points  out that in  the  U.S.,  the  monetary  base  is very
small  relative  to  the  stock  of  Federal  Government  debt,  and  this
concentrating  on  the  seigniorage  impact  of  inflation  is  misleading.  This,44
derived  from  a specific  transaction  cost  model  and  depends  on expected  future
inflation,  as in Turnovsky  and  Brock  (1980),  the  optimal  inflation  rate is
white  noise. 34 In the  case of the  developing  nations  the  results  reported  in
Tables  2 and 3 indicate  that  contrary  to Judd's  implications,  for  the  vast
majority  of cases  the  hypothesis  of unit root  cannot  be rejected. Moreover,
Ljung-Box  test for  those  countries  for  which  a  unit root  was rejected
indicate  that inflation  did  not follow  a  white  noise  process.
To summarize,  then,  the  results  reported  in this  Appendix  clearly
indicate  that the  various  versions  of the  theory  of inflation  as a component
of a dynamic  optimal  tax  plan,  are  rejected  by the  data.  This,  then,
provides  a sound  empirical  motivation  for  investigating  alternative
explanations  for the  observed  cross  country  differentials  in inflation
illustrated  on Table  1.
of course,  is a  valid  point  for  the  U.S. and  other  industrial  countries.
However,  most of our  developing  nations  have  very l  domestic  government
debt.  Moreover,  in many  of them  this  debt is  insexed.
34This contention,  of course,  is exactly  the  opposite  to that  of the
Crilli  and Poterba  and  Rotemberg  models  discussed  above,  where  a  white
process  for inflation  means  a rejection  of the  optimal  taxation  policy.
This sharp  difference  in implications  is due to the  fact that  Grilli  and
Poterba  and  Summers  postulate  that  actual  (rather  than  expected)  inflation
imposes  welfare  costs.45
APPENDIX  II
Tha  HeasureMent  Of P2l1tical  instability
A central  proposition  of  a  large  number  of  political  economy  models  is
that  political  instability  and  political  institutions  affect  pollcy
decisions.  For  example,  most  models  of  strategic  government  behavior
predict  that  countries  that  are  politically  more  unstable  will  tend  to  rely
more  heavily  on  the  inflation  tax,  and  will  tend  to  have  higher  fiscal
deficits.  This  means,  then,  that  in  order  to  empirically  test  the
implications  of  these  theoretical  models  we  have  to  measure  political
LnstbtLixy. In  this  Appendix  we  discuss  some  ways  of  doing  this  and
present  some  results  taken  from  Cukierman,  Edwards,  Tabelllni  (1989).
In  the  models  discussed  in  Sections  II  and  III  of  the  paper,  political
instability  is defined  as  the gercei_ed  probabilLty  that  the  government  in
office  will  be  replaced  by a  government  with  different  political  views
(preferences).  This  replacement  can  be of a normal  democratic  form,  or
alternatively,  it  can  be unscheduled,  taking  place  via  a  coup.
From  a  cross  country  comparative  perspective,  more  unstable  countries
are  those  that,  on  average,  have  a  higher  (percelved)  probability  of  bbing
replaced.  The  sLmplest  way  of  measuring  political  instabillty  is  by
calculating  the  frequency  of  government  change  through  time. That  is:
n
INST  - (B.1)
where n  ls  the  number  of  government  changes  during  the  period  under
consideration,  and Y  is the  number  of  years  comprised  in  that  time  period.
The  variable  n  can  either  include  or  exclude  irregular  government
transfers  via  coups.46
However,  this  index  of  political  instability  is  too  simple  and,  thus,
unable  to  capture  more  subtle  aspects  of  the  political  reality  of  different
countries.  A particular  serious  limitation  is  that  for  countries  with  no
observed  government  changes  during  the  period  under  analysis  that  is,
countries  with continuous  dictatorial  rule  during  the  period  --  the  value  of
the  index  will  be  zero. This  will  be  the  case  even  if  the  actual  perceived
probability  of  a  government  change  is  greater  than  zero. One  way  of  tack-
ling  this  problem  is  by  computing  perceived  probabilities  of  default  from
time  series  on  political,  institutional,  and  economic  developments  for  each
country.  These  estimated  perceived  probabilities  can  then  be  used  in  cross
country  regressions  that  try  to  determine  the  role  of  political  factors  in
the  design  of  economic  policy.  This  approach  has  been  followed,  for
example,  by  Cukierman,  Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1989)  in  their  paper  on
seignorage  and  political  stability.
In  constructing  their  index  of  politlcal  instability,  CET  used  a  data
set  on  political  developments  across  the  world  compiled  by  Taylor-Jodice
(1983).  These  data  contain  yearly  observations  on  regular  and  irregular
(i.e.  coups)  government  transfers,  unsuccessful  coup  attempts,  executive
adjustments,  and  other  political  events.  Cukierman,  Edwards  and  Tabellini
proceeded  as  follows.  First,  they  estimate  a  yearly  probit  model  on  time
series  data,  or  on  pooled  time  series  and  cross  country  data,  over  the
period  1948-82.  The  dependent  variable  look  a  value  of  0  for  the  years  in
which  there  was  no  government  change  (regular  or  irregular),  and  a  value  of
1  otherwise.  Changes  in  the  composition  of  the  executive  were  not  consider-
ed  to  be  changes  in  government.  The explanatory  variables  in  the  probit
model  fell  in  three  broad  classes:  economic  variables,  designed  to  measure
the  recent  economic  performance  of  the  government;  political  variables,47
accounting  for  significant  political  events  that  may  signal  the  imminence  of
a  crisis;  and  structural  variables,  accounting  for  institutional  differences
and  country  specific  factors  that  do  not  change,  or  that  change  only  slowly
over  time. These  structural  variables  consisted  of  three  dummy  variables
that  group  countries  in  three  categories,  according  to  their  political
institutions:  (i) democracies;  (ii) democracies  in  which  the  election
date  is  determined  by  the  constitution;  and (iii) democracies  ruled  by  a
single  majoritarian  party. Even  though  these  three  groups  are  too  broad  to
account  for  the  variety  of  existing  political  institutions,  CET  argue  that
at  least  they  discriminate  between  very  different  constitutional
environments.  All  these  variables  are  defined  in  Table  A.4  below.
Table  A.5  reports  the  results  of  the  probit  regression  when  all
countries  were  pooled  together  in  the  same  data,  with  country  specific
dummies.  Notice  that  although  most  variables  have  the  expected  sign,  only  a
few  are  significant.  According  to  these  results  government  changes  are  made
more  likely  by  unusual  inflation  in  the  prevlous  year,  and  by  unusually  low
growth  of  private  consumption  over  the  current  and  previous  two  years. (As
explained  in  Table  A.4,  these  variables  are  measured  in  deviation  from  their
country  means.)  Moreover,  riots,  political  repressions,  adjustments  in  the
composition  of  the  executive,  and  unsuccessful  attempts  to  change  the
government  all  signal  the  imminence  of  a  political  crisis.  Two  of  the
institutional  dummies  are  significant:  not  surprisingly  (perhaps)  democra-
cies  have  more  frequent  government  changes  than  non-democratic  regimes.
Also,  coalition  governments  or  minority  governments  are  less  stable  than
majoritarian  governments.  CET  report  that  these  estimates  were  very  robust
to changes  in the  model  specificstion.  As a second  index  of instability,
CET estimated  the  same  probit  regression  on each  country  separately  (except48
that the  structural  variables  have  been dropped  and  all lags  of the  same
variables  have been  constrained  to  have the  same coefficient,  in  order  to
save  degrees  of freedom).
The  pooled  time  serles-cross  country  and the  country  speclfic  probit
regressions  were used  by CET to  compute  two  estimated  frequencies  of
government  change  for  79 countrles  during  the  period  1971-82. These  indexes
were actually  calculated  by averaging  the  estimated  probabilities  of
government  change  over that time  period. Table  A.5 contains  a  comparison,
in  the form  of Spearman  rank  coefficients,  of the  two  estimated  instability
indexes  and  to more simple  index  calculated  out  of observed  historical
frequencies  of government  change. Here  P  stands  for the  estimated  index
using  pooled  data,  PS  refers  to the  instability  index  estimated  from
country-specific  data and  F  is the  historical  frequencies  index. As can
be seen,  the  degree  of correlation  across  indexes  is  high but  not
overwhelming,  suggesting  that  all three  indexes  could  be used to advantage
in  cross  country  studies  of the  political  economy  of macroeconomic  pollcies.
The  purpose  of this  Appendix  has been to dLscuss  ways in  which
statistical  methods  can  be used to generate  variables  related  to  political
developments,  that  can  then  be used in  cross  country  studies  on the
political  economy  of macroeconomic  policy. The existence  of data sets  with
vast informatLon  on political  developments  facilitate  this  task,  allowing
researchers  to use  conventional  methods  to generate  these  polltical  indexes.
Moreover,  the  results  obtalned  in  regresslons  that  directly  use these
indexes  are  highly  encouraging,  suggestlng  that this  avenue  for  empirical
inquiry  can  be particularly  fruitful.49
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Inflation  Tax in  Selected  Developing  Countries
(Averages)
19619 72l  12Z  3-1278  1978-1983  1983-1987
Infla-  Infla-  Infla-  Infla-  Infla-  Infla-  Infla-  Infla-
tion  tlon  tion  tion  tlon  tion  tion  tion
Rate  Revenue  Rate  Revenue  Rate  Revenue  Rate  Revenue
As % of
G--
Algeria  4.8  n.a.  10.4  5.41  10.0  5.15  9.2  5.49
Burundi  3.4  0.33  13.8  1.58  14.4  1.79  6.8  0.84
Cameroon  3.8  0.49  13.6  1.81  11.4  1.52  5.3  1.40
Congo  3.6  0.56  10.9  1.77  10.6  1.32  7.1  1.32
Cote dllvoire  3.9  0.70  16.3  3.33  10.7  2,14  4.5  0.81
Ethiopia  1.8  0.20  14.9  2.33  6.4  1.18  3.8  0.82
Ghana  10.0  1.51  58.7  9.81  73.2  7.84  28.6  2.09
Kenya  3.2  0.60  16.0  2.75  13.1  2.05  8.1  1.10
Madagascar  3.7  0.66  8.9  1.60  22.8  4.54  12.5  1.77
Malavi  5.5  0.63  9.6  1.28  13.0  1.25  17.4  1.49
Nigeria  5.9  0.54  22.3  2.64  14.7  2.32  15.2  2.41
Senegal  4.7  0.66  12.8  2.34  10.7  2.24  6.7  2.21
Sudan  5.1  0.74  17.6  2.60  27.5  5.56  35.3  n.a.
Tanzania  10.0  1.77  15.1  3.03  25.1  7.08  32.9  7.41
Togo  2.9  0.39  13.1  2.42  12.0  3.22  -0.3  -1.04
Tunisia  3.8  0.96  6.2  1.55  9.9  2.60  7.4  2.05
Uganda  na.  n.e.  n.e.  na.  36.8  4.56  179.6  20.24
Zaire  19.0  3.61  50.9  10.72  59.8  9.14  53.3  7.87
Zambia  6.0  0.82  14.6  2.69  13.5  2.29  38.0  5.64
Bangladesh  12.6  na.  17.8  1.83  13.2  1.23  10.4  1.07
Burma  7.3  1.76  14.4  2.69  3.5  0.70  11.0  1.58
India  8.3  1.33  7.3  1.15  10.1  1.43  7.8  1.13
Korea  13.4  1.14  17.9  1.85  15.8  1.44  2.6  0.25
Malaysta  2.2  0.37  6.8  1.19  5.9  1.06  1.5  0.29
Pakistan  6.8  1.96  14.2  3.41  8.9  2.29  4.9  1.23
Philippines  8.7  0.86  13.5  1.13  13.8  1.06  19.5  1.17
Singapore  3.1  0.80  6.2  1.43  5.2  1.22  0.5  0.1153
Table  I  (cgont.
1963-1973  1973-1078  1978-1983  1983.1987
Infla.  Infla-  Infla- Infla-  Infla- Infla-  Infla-  Infla-
tion  tion  tion  tion  tion  tlon  tion  tion
Rate  Revenue  Rate  Revenue  Rate  Revenue  Rate  Revenue
AS %  of
Sri  Lanka  4.3  0.68  6.7  0.83  15.9  1.89  8.5  0.91
Creece  3.9  0.69  15.7  2.82  21.9  3.64  19.3  2.81
Spain  7.4  2.13  18.4  5.34  14.5  3.62  8.5  2.12
Portugal  6.2  3.36  23.3  11.08  21.6  7.32  17.4  6.36
Turkey  7.7  1.63  24.9  5.03  53.8  7.73  41.7  4.61
Yugoslavia  15.1  3.53  16.9  4.55  32.7  7.54  84.4  9.38
South  Africa  4.5  0.75  11.5  1.63  13.8  1.92  15.7  2.73
Argentlna  30.3  n.a.  200.1  25.03  174.7  12.04  380.1  22.00
Bolivia  8.4  0.85  18.7  1.71  99.6  8.67  524.1  105.68
Brazil  34.5  5.20  36.2  4.42  96.2  6.66  199.7  8.24
Chile  65.7  24.95  244.7  13^06  25.1  1.45  22.5  1.27
Colombia  11.5  1.71  23.7  3.12  24-.6  2.94  20.6  1.97
Cost&  Rica  3.8  0.62  12.2  1.85  37.4  5.93  13.9  2.19
Dominican  Rep.  3.4  0.35  10.4  1.04  9.2  0.82  24.7  2.33
Ecuador  6.1  0.91  14.8  2.34  20.9  3.28  27.9  3.64
El  Salvador  1.6  0.19  13.6  1.82  14.4  2.29  22.7  3.25
Honduras  2.9  0.29  8.1  0.92  11.4  1.32  3.7  0.52
Jamaica  5.8  0.62  20.1  2.51  17.5  2.46  18.8  2.95
Mexico  4.6  0.53  20.2  2.05  46.6  3.93  85.3  4.36
Nicaragua  27.1  3.38  7.9  0.91  32.6  6.14  462.1  8.61
Paraguay  3.8  0.34  11.3  1.02  16.9  1.62  24.8  1.97
Peru  9.9  1.32  33.9  5.54  75.4  7.35  109.4  8.04
Uruguay  62.2  7.82  62.4  5.68  46.5  3.81  66.9  4.42
7enezur'  2.4  0.31  8.2  1.44  13.2  2.52  15.8  2.83
lrfl.:iton  Rate  - line  64x  (CPI)
Infl.:.  &on  Revenue  - (line  64x)  x (line  34)  +  (line  99b)
Inflation  Rate  times  the  Ratio  Money/GDP
figLUM:  IFS  Tapes54
TABLE  2
Inflation  and  Political  Instability
Specification  1:
1963  - 1271  1973  12?8 1978  1983 1983L:-_1281
Intercept  2.664  18.669*  15.654*  -132.98
(3.146  )  (8.240)  (6.454)  (84.25)
Frequency  of  23.654*  29.121  41.623*  907.42**
Govt.  Change  (9.521)  (26.873)  (20.205)  (263.76)
R2 (adj.)  0.092  0.003  0.060  0.175
SE  11.884  41.794  28.371  370.36
N  51  51  51  51
Specification  2:
1963  - 1973  1973 - 1978  1978 - 1983  1983 - 1988
Intercept  6.126*  20.279*  14.325**  -41.256
(2.935)  (7.617)  (5.222)  (44.389)
Regular  Govt.  5.041  3.242  24.530*  89.752
Transfer  (7.012)  (13.360)  (9.626)  (81.815)
Coups  13.212  45.236  44.427  2039.5**
(15.481)  (37.510)  (23.919)  (203.30)
R2 (adj.)  0.003  -0.008  0.194  0.701
SE  12.561  !'2.428  26.498  225.22
N  50  50  50  50
Standard  errors  are in  parentheses.
The  dependent  variable  is  the  average  rate  of  inflation  over  the  relevant
time  interval.
*  :  significant  at  the  5%  level.
**  :  significant  at  the  1%  level.55
TABLE 3
Trade  Taxes  and  Political  Instability
(Ordinary  Least  Squares)
(1)  (2)  (3)
Intercept  0.4616**  0.0834  0.0927
(0.0001)  (0.0654)  (0.0604)
Agriculture  - 0.0065**  0.0059**
(0.0014)  (0.0013)
Mining  and  Manufacturing  -0.0071**  -
(0.0012)
Foreign  Trade  0.0061  0.0401  0.0329
(0.0310)  (0.0357)  (0.0330)
GDP  per  Capita  0.69E-5  -0.22E-5  -0.42E-5
(0.50E-5)  (0.47E-5)  (0.43E-5)
Urbanization  -0.0025*  -0.0003**  -0.0002
(0.0006)  (0 0O08)  (0.0007)
Industrialized  -0.1619**  -0.0917  -0.0573
(0.0379)  (0.0522)  (0.0394)
Latin  America  -0.0003
(0.0417)
Political  Instability  0.1113  0.0317
(0.0904)  (0.0980)
Regular  Government  - - -0.0277
Transfers  (0.0385)
Coups  Frequency  0.1544
(0.  1267)
0.712  0.675  0.681
MSE  0.085  0.091  0.089
N  61  61  61
Standard  errors  are  in parentheses
**Means  significant  at 5% level;
Means  significant  coefficient  at 1% level.56
TABLE 4A
Budget  Deficit  as  Percentage  of  CDP
1963  - 1973  1973  *  1978  1978  - 1983  1983  - 1988
Country  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Greece  1.4  1.8  3.3  3.4  5.9  5.8  6.5  10.3
Portugal  -0.2  1.6  5.3  7.0  4.6  10.7  0.7  9.7
Spain  1.8  1.4  1.7  1.4  4.1  4.5  0.5  7.1
Turkey  0.4  2.5  2.3  2.9  4.0  4.1  1.0  6.2
Yugoslavia  1.0  1.0  1.5  1.4  0.3  0.4  . 0.0
S.  Africa  0.8  3.1  1.0  4.4  . 3.6  . 4.5
Argentina  . . . 5.3  . 6.4  7.0  7.0
Bolivia  3.8  2.8  0.1  3.8  5.5  12.3  2.5  16.0
Brazil  0.5  0.0  -0.9  0.3  0.1  2.3  -0.1  8.2
Chile  2.5  . 2.0  0.2  -1.5  1.5  2.2
Colombia  0.5  1.0  0.4  0.2  0.2  2.3  1.5  2.8
Costa  Rica  0.3  3.3  1.5  3.0  2.7  4.2  1.0  2.1
Dominican  Rep.  0.8  1.7  0.7  0.4  2.4  3.0  0.7  1.5
Ecuador  0.7  2.7  . 1.1  . 2.5  1.1  1.2
El  Salvador  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.2  2.9  4.0  0.1  1.9
Honduras  0.2  1.3  0.4  0.9  1.9  4.1  1.2  8.0
Mexico  1.1  2.0  1.8  3.9  3.4  6.3  5.9  9.1
Nicaragua  0.0  1.2  1.0  5.0  7.5  13.6  3.3  22.9
Panama  0.1  3.3  2.5  7.4  .1.2  8.6  2.2  5.2
Paraguay  0.3  0.3  -0.6  -0.2  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.4
Peru  1.1  2.9  2.4  5.2  2.3  4.3  4.0  7.2
Uruguay  1.6  2.3  1.5  2.3  2.5  2.6  4.5  3.0
Venezuela  0.1  -0.2  -2.9  0.6  1.1  1.6  -1.2  -1.2
Jamaica  0.4  3.1  4.7  11.3  8.0  16.3  0.2  13.7
Bangladesh  . 1.9  0.9  0.3  0.7  -1.2  0.3  -0.8
Burma  2.8  -2.0  2.9  1.8  -3.3  -1.2  -0.9  0.1
Sri  Lanka  1.1  6.6  1.2  6.7  4.3  13.3  1.1  9.2
India  1.3  4.3  1.3  4.1  3.0  5.9  3.5  7.9
Korea  0.1  0.8  0.9  1.5  1.1  2.1  0.2  0.6
Malaysia  0.4  5.4  0.6  7.2  1.0  13.1  -1.0  8.2
Pakistan  2.2  5.7  2.7  8.1  3.2  6.6  2.3  7.2
Philippines  0.4  0.9  0.3  1.1  1.3  2.1  0.2  2.6
Singapore  -3.0  0.3  -3.0  -0.7  -0.4  -1.9  1.0  -2.4
Algeria  1.9  . 3.2  . 2.7  . 5.1  0
Burundi  0.6  -0.4  0.0  -0.5  2.3  1.1  0.8  -0.1
Cameroon  0.1  . . 1.3  . 0.1  0.7  -0.2
Congo,  Peop.  Rep.  0.1  2.2  2.0  . 0.0  4.8  1.1  3.3
Zaire  0.5  4.1  7.3  13.7  5.2  6.8  10.8  2.8
Ethiopia  0.2  0.9  1.8  3.4  2.4  6.0  3.0  9.2
Chana  1.9  4.8  6.1  7.8  3.5  5.7  3.9  1.2
Cote  D'lvoire  0.0  . 1.0  . 1.8  . 0.0
Kenya  1.0  3.8  1.2  3.7  2.4  4.1  1.6  4.2
Madagascar  0.3  . -1.8  . 6.7  . 2.9
Nigeria  1.5  2.1  1.0  -2.8  3.3  -8.7  2.3  4.7
Senegal  0.5  0.9  0.7  1.5  2.2  2.5  0.6  7.157
Tle  4A (cont.)
1963  - 1973  1973  - 1978  1978  1  1983  1983  - 1988
Country  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Sudan  1.9  2.2  3.3  3.2  2.1  3.9
Tanzania  1.0  4.6  2.9  5.7  6.4  8.4  3.0  5.9
TopO  0.0  . . 27.2  0.6  8.5  0.1  2.7
Tunlita  0.4  1.2  0.9  2.9  0.8  4.7  1.1  6.6
Ugand  3.3  6.5  3.1  4.9  3.5  3.6  3.5  3.9
Zambia  2.5  4.3  7.8  12.8  6.7  13.6  13.4  11.5
Note:
(1)  - Change  in  Monetary  System's  Credit  to  the  Government  (IFS,  line  32an)
(2)  - Central  Covernment Budget  Deficit  (IFS  line  80..h,  supplemented  by
80..t  or  80.r.  where necessary)58
TABLE  4B
Correlation  between  Two Measures  of  Budget  Deficit





Pearson  Correlation  coefficients  between  columns  (1)  and  (2)  in  Table  7A.59
TABLE  5
Domestic  Credit  to  the  Public  Sector  as  a  Fraction  of
Total  Credit  From  the  Central  Bank
(in  percentages)
1963  19Z3  1273  1979  157fiX12m3  1983-1988
Algeria  45.4  15.9  35.5  62.1
Burundi  41.7  27.2  45.3  71.6
Cameroon  3.2  22.5  18.9  24.2
Congo  22.8  44.4  40.8  53.4
Cote  d'lvoire  2.8  2.4  25.7  40.9
Ethiopia  42.9  36.2  50.7  54.7
Ghana  51.4  72.4  72.5  50.9
Kenya  10.8  26.9  50.8  62.4
Madagascar  -7.8  43.9  90.8  85.4
Malawi  11.1  22.6  64.3  82.3
Nigeria  41.2  19.3  60.4  77.6
Senegal  0.1  6.5  27.8  48.6
Sudan  n.a  n.a  n.-  na.
Tanzania  25.4  45.0  88.3  93.3
Togo  0.7  14.2  30.7  27.7
Tunisia  44.8  15.5  9.6  5.2
Uganda  47.7  90.8  89.9  86.5
Zaire  71.8  84.6  76.1  71.3
Zambla  10.8  71.6  94.0  87.1
Bangladesh  61.5  55.1  40.1  25.2
Burma  n.a  n.a  n.a.  n.a.
India  82.3  64.6  63.0  74.6
Korea  33.4  32.6  22.9  15.1
Malaysia  5.6  6.6  12.6  17.6
Pakistan  64.3  55.2  56.9  58.7
Philippines  35.9  20.1  22.3  38.2
Singapore  nU.e  n.e.  n.a.  n.a.
Sri  Lank  84.5  63  6  64.5  67.86n
Table  S (ont.1
- 6A923  192971t
Greece  28.5  27.9  48.6  S6.8
Spain  33.2  31.9  52.0  47.6
Portugal  5.6  33.2  46.3  47.4
Turkey  S1.2  32.1  48.1  67.1
Yugoslavia  32.1  35.3  17.3  6.3
South  Africa  29.8  45.7  31.6  12.0
Argentina  n.a.  20.9  29.0  35.9
Bolivia  $7.9  S6.1  78.1  41.1
Brazil  32.9  .36.2  24.9  12.0
Chile  89.3  80.1  37.7  15.8
Colombia  42.9  Mg.9  6.9  33.4
Costa  Rica  35.5  34.8  37.1  25.0
Dominican  Republic  50.6  43.1  37.4  37.1
Ecuador  48.2  28.1  13.6  38.4
El  Salvador  27.9  29.9  47.5  39.9
Honduras  24.2  18.7  . 31.9  38.5
Jamaica  a1.6  65.4  88.5  82.3
Mexico  42.3  79.2  82.2  56.3
Nicaragua  22.8  2S.3  54.0  74.3
Panama  59.8  63.1  65.5  83.1
Paragay  50.1  13.2  5.3  16.7
Peru  S2.3  45.5  3S.2  30.8
Uruguay  44.2  34.2  31.1  46.1
Venezuela  12.1  3.3  8.6  6.7
(Line  12a)  +  Sum  of  (line  (11)  +  (line  12a)  +  (line  12b)  +  (line  12c)
+  (line  12d)  +  (line  12.)  +  (line  12f)
(Central  Bank's  credit  to  the  government  as  a  fraction  of  total  Central
Banks .credit)
oures:  rIFS  tapes.h1
TABLE  6A
Budget  Deficit  and  Political  Instability
1963  - 1973  1973  - 197§  ,19-78  - 1983  1SS3  IM9E
Dependont
Variable:  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Explanatory
Variables:
Intercept 2.333**  4.406**  5.888**15.596**  5.751**11.820**  1.536 11.546*
(.7d8  )  (1.593)  (1.995)  (4.468)  (2.047)  (4.064) (2.967)  (4.717)
Agricult. -0.020  -0.042  -0.055  .0.182*  -0.053 -0.156* -0.007 -0.162
(.015  ) (.030  )  (  .037)  (.087  )  (.039  )  (.069)  (.051  )  (.081)
Forgn.Trd.  -1.665**  1.301  -1.245  0.074 -0.550  0.407  -0.118 -1.434
(.508  )  (.952  )  (1.048)  (2.283)  (.840  )  (1.600) (1.393)  (2.125)
GDP  p  Cap  -0.0002  0.0002 -0.0002  0.00005  0.00003  -0.0003  -0.0008  -0.0005
(.0002)  (.0004)  (.0005)  (.0012)  (.0005)  (.0009) (.0005)  (.0008)
Urbaniz.  -0.013  -0.075**  -0.043  -0.152  -0.050-  -0.112  0.051  -0.058
(.014  )  (.027  )  (.038  )  (.076  )  (.037  )  (.069  )  (.043  )  (.066  )
Freqncy  of  1.468  3.338* -0.622  -3.653  2.098  7.589*  0.553 9.383*
Govt.  Change(.816  )  (1.594)  (2.011)  (4.439)  (1.908)  (3.818) (2.472)  (3.885)
R2  (adj.)  0.262  0.173  0.063 0.074  0.021  0.108  -0.032  0.155
SE  0.923  1.738  2.171 4.812  2.298  4.483  2.905 4.432
N  46  42  42  43  43  44  45  43
Note:  the  2  dependent  variables,  denoted  by (1)  and  (2)  above,  are:
(1):  Change  In  the  Monetary  System's  credlt  to  the  government  (as  a
percentage  of  GDP)
(2):  Central  Government  budget  deficit  (as  percentage  of  CDP)
Standard  Errors  are  in  parentheses
*  means  the  coefficient  Is  significant  at  the  5%  level.
**  means  the  coefficient  is  significant  at  the  1%  level62
TABLE 65
Budget  Deficit  and Political  Instability
l9f63  2  9i  1273 - 2198  i2ZB  1i_123:_1
Dependent
Variable:  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Explanatory
Variables:
Intercept  2.351**  4.433**  5.108**14.358**  6.593**12.998**  1.279  13.39**
(.746  ) (1.612)  (1.827)  (4.347)  (2.088)  (3.974) (3.001)  (4.504)
Agricult.  .0.020 -0.038 -0.051 -0.179*  -0.071  -0.184*  -0.007  -0.197*
(.014  )  (.030  ) (.035  )  (.085  )  (.039  )  (.077  )  (.052  )  (.079  )
Forgn.Trd.  -1.501**  1.286  -1.064  0.560  -0.557 0.344  0.056  -1.550
(.490  )  (.994  )  (.982  )  (2.214)  (.821  )  (1.604) (1.413)  (2.075)
GDP  p  Cap.  .0.00007  0.0001  -0.0008  -0.001 0.00003  -0.0007  -0.0009  -0.0007
(.0002)  (.0004)  (.0005)  (.001  )  (.0005)  (.0009) (.0006)  (.0008)
Urbaniz.  .0.015  -0.065*  -0.010 -0.099  -0.051  -0.089  0.057  -. 053
(.013  ) (.027  )  (.037  ) (.078  )  (.039  )  (.067  )  (.045  )  (.064  )
Reg  Govt.  0.055  0.857  1.316  0.516  -0.350  2.414  0.752  2.021
Transfers  (.512  ) (1.071)  (.916  )  (2.051)  (1.244)  (2.052) (1.334)  (2.012)
Coups  2.903*  2.483  -1.673 -2.564  3.919  5.106  -0.354 8.208
(1.152)  (2.448)  (1.934)  (4.570)  (2.478)  (4.582) (2.915)  (4.441)
R2(adj.)  0.317  0.104  0.098  0.042  0.023  0.093  -0.042 0.164
SE  0.879  1.780  2.085  4.833  2.292  4.546  2.902 4.455
N  47  44  44  45  45  46  46  45
Note:  the  2 dependent  variables,  denoted  by (1)  and (2)  above,  are:
(1):  Change  in  the  Monetary  System's  credit  to the  government  (as  a
percentage  of GDP)
(2):  Central  i:-vernment  budget  deficit (as  percentage  of  CDP)
Standard  Erz-'  .re  In  parentheses
*  means  the  eef*lcent  Is  significant  at the  5% level.
**  seans  the  coit.Jiclent  Is  significant  at the  1% level6-4
TABLE  7
Devaluation  Crises  in  Selected  Developing  Countries:
Rate  of  Devaluation  (percentage)a
Per_entage  of  Deval_ation
Year  of  One  Year
Devaluation  Year  of  After  Two  Years Three  Years
Countrv.  Crisis  Devalmatlon  D2valuati±n  AEter  After
A.  SteRwise  Devaluations
Argentina  1970  25.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Bolivia  1972  66.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
Bolivia  1979  25.0  0.0  0.0  684.0
Colombia  1962  34.3  0.0  0.0  50.0
Colombia  1965  50.0  0.0  16.7  7.1
Costa  Rica  1974  28.8  0.0  0.0  0.0
Cyprus  1967  16.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ecuador  1961  20.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ecuador  1970  38.8  0.0  0.0  0.0
Egypt  1962  23.9  0.0  0.0  0.0
Egypt  1979  78.8  0.0  0.0  0.0
Guyana  1967  15.9  0.9  0.6  0.2
India  1966  58.6  -0.3  1.0  -0.9
Indonesia  1978  50.6  0.3  .0.0  2.7
Israel  1962  66.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
Israel  1967  16.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
Israel  1971  20.0  0.0  0.0  7.1
Jamaica  1967  15.9  0.9  -0.6  0.2
Jamaica  1978  86.4  5.1  0.0  0.0
Malta  1967  16.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
Nicaragua  1979  43.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Pakistan  1972  130.1  -10.2  0.0  0.0
Peru  1967  44.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Philippines  1962  94.0  0.2  0.0  0.0
Philippines  1970  63.7  0.0  5.3  -0.7
Sri  Lanka  1967  24.1  0.0  0.5  0.0
Trinidad  1967  15.9  0.9  -0.6  0.2
Venezuela  1964  38.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Yugoslavia  1965  66.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
B. Devaluations  Followed  by  Crawling  Peb
Bolivia  1982  684.0  155.1  1700.0
Chile  1982  88.2  19.2  46.5  43.3
Colombia  1967  16.7  7.1  5.7  6.9
Ecuador  1982  32.6  63.1  24.1  42.5
Kenya  1981  35.9  23.7  8.4  14.364
Table  7  (Cont.1
Pecntage  of  Doev&d.ation
Year  of  One Year
Devaluation  Year  of  After  Two Years  Three  Years
Countx  _  Crisls  Devalugatio  Devaluatlon  After  After
Korea  1980  36.3  6.1  6.9  6.2
Mexico  1976  59.6  13.9  -0.0  0.3
Mexico  1982  267.8  49.1  33.7  93.0
Pakistan  1982  29.6  5.1  13.7  4.0
Peru  1975  16.2  54.2  87.9  50.4
bevaluation  of  the  official  rate  with  respect  to  the  U.S.  dollar.  In  the
case  of  multiple  rates  the  IFS  reports  the  'most  comons  of  them.
Surge:  Edwards (1989)65
TABLE  8
Successful  and  Unsuccessful  Devaluations
A.  Stepwise  Devaluers
A.I.  - 1SuccessfulrDevaluation  EgfLodes











Sri  LAnka  1967
Venezuela  1964























Table  8 (cont.)
B.2. - Limited-Success  Cawler
Kenya  1981
Pakistan  1982






Source: See  text.67
TABLE  9
Summary  Statistics  on  Timing  of Devaluations
Presidential  Parliamentary  Dictatorial
DeMgainurj;  Democracies  Regimes
Percentage  of cases  where  2  77.3%  70.0%  42.9%
or fewer  years  elapsed  since
last  government  transfer
Percentage  of cases  where  31.8%  20.0%  0.0%
devaluation  took  place  1 or
fewer  years  years  before  next
government  transferTABLE  10
Summary  Statistics  on Political  Instability
For  Devaluation  Episodes
Frequency  Unsuccessful
of  Govt.  Frequency Violence  Transfer  Regression
Transfers of CouRs  Index  Ataepts  Index
A.  Historical  Indicators
Successful  0.55  0.06  0.05  0.29  0.30
Limited  Success  0.67  0.07  0.18  0.28  0.25
Unsuccessful  0.54  0.13  0.20  0.35  0.15
B.  Post  Devaluation  (3  Years)  Indicators
Successful  0.33  0.06  0.07  0.09
Limited  Success  0.44  0.01  0.36  0.07
Unsuccessful  0.73  0.11  0.36  0.0869
TABLE  11
Discriminant  Analysis  of Devaluation  Episodes





Limited  Success  77.8%
Unsuccessful  100.0%7r
TABLE  A.1
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  Unit Root  Tests  for
Inflation  and  Taxes:  Selected  Developing  Nations
CguntEX ~  Inflation  -TAXIS
t  t  t  tt
Brazil  -0.172  -0.714  -2.278  -1.521
Burma  -2.437  -2.721  -0.709  -0.069
Burundl  -1.415  -0.634  -1.178  -1.876
Ecuador  -0.008  -2.73.  -0.216  -1.811
El Salvador  -0.693  -2.419  -2.169  -2.197
Ethiopia  -1.422  -1.128  -0.808  -2.18C
Ghana  -1.580  -1.850  -0.868  -1.646
Greece  -0.064  -2.265  -1.000  -1.189
Honduras  -1.434  -1.373  -0.320  -2.768
India  -3.216  -4.150  -2.640  -2.748
Jamaica  -0.818  -1.390  -0.520  -1.729
Kenya  -1.731  -1.118  -1.179  -2.969
Malaysia  -1.903  -2.040  -0.004  -1.719
Nigeria  -1.260  -1.753  -1.689  -0.281
Pakistan  -2.138  -2.369  -1.213  -2.075
Philippines  -1.233  -2.608  -2.436  -2.601
Singapore  -1.972  -1.677  2.019  1.005
South  Africa  -0.001  -2.707  0.003  -2.761
Yugoslavia  -2.772  -1.901  -0.835  -2.452
Zambia  -0.534  -1.593  -0.065  -3.255
NOT:  T  tests  the  hypothesis  of  unit  root  without  a  time  trend,  while  Tt
Includes  a time  trend. The critical  values  of these  tests  at 95S
confidence  for  25  observations  are  T  - -3.0  and  Tt - -3.6.71
TABLE  A.2
Augmented  Dickey  Fuller  Tests  for  Quarterly  Inflation
t  t  N
Argentina  -2.578  -3.638*  122
Bangladesh  -3.210*  -3.415  71
Brazil  2.901*  2.179  119
Burundi  -2.389  -2.331  86
Cameroon  -2.391  -2.681  98
Chile  -2.000  -2.059  95
Colombia  -2.231  -3.728*  122
Congo  -2.295  -2.185  96
Cote  d'lvoire  -1.792  -1.874  102
Dominican  Republic  -1.125  -3.227  121
Ecuador  1.390  -0.530  123
El  Salvador  -1.045  -3.354  122
Ethiopia  -2.645  -2.604  87
Greece  -1.327  -1.957  123
Honduras  -2.468  -2.622  122
Hong Kong  -2.520  -2.511  75
India  -3.208*  -3.298  122
Korea  -1.746  -2.332  71
Madagascar  -1.144  -2.053  86
Malavi  -0.355  -1.041  25
Malaysian  -2.654  -2.713  123
Mexico  -1.328  -3.521*  123
Nigeria  -2.935*  -3.454*  118
Pakistan  -2.275  -2.442  123
Paraguay  -1.669  -2.967  122
Pori  0.122  -1.863  119
Philippines  -2.747  -3.076  123
Portugal  -1.577  -1.384  122
Senegal  -1.945  -1.918  78
Slngapor4  -2.321  -2.395  877?
Tabls  A.2  fG21nt
N
Somalia  -1.541  -3.490*  93
South  Africa  -0.806  -3.069  123
Spain  -1.480  -1.494  123
Sri  Lanka  -1.602  -2.446  123
Sudan  -1.670  -2.987  115
Tanzania  -1.369  -2.678  70
Togo  -1.933  -2.417  67
Tunisia  -2.216  -4.0'6*  123
Turkey  -1.556  -2.000  72
Uganda  -1.040  41.526  26
Uruguay  -2.458  -2.522  123
Venezuela  2.941*  1.368  123
Zaire  -1.917  -2.644  93
Zimbabwe  -1.933  &3.553  22
*The H0 of  unit  root  Is  rejected  at  95%  confidence.
These  data  correspond  to  line 64X of  the  International  Flnanclal
Statistics.73
TABLE  A.3
A Test of the  Theory  of Optimal  Taxation  in
Selected  Developing  Countries: 1954.19878
AINF  0  +  a TAX  +  t
OLS  !~~~~nstrumental  Vrals
OLS  ,,  rlabls
Country  a  a  D.W.  0  1  D.W.  N
Brazil  6.977  -0.062  1.035  6.980  -0.062  1.053  25
(1.820) (-0.052)  (1.722) (-0.051)
Burma  0.426  0.180  1.678  -0.768  0.660  1.578  23
(0.238)  (0.257)  (-0.353)  (0.743)
Burundi  0.266  1.282  2.274  .0.561  1^192  2.282  18
(-0.118)  (1.020)  (-0.225)  (0.888)
Ecuador  0.830  -0.365  2.682  1.167  -0.439  2.686  32
(0.631) (-0.384)  (0.847) (-0.452)
El Salvador  0.873  -0.462  2.099  1.026  -0.479  2.099  31
(0.984) (-0.768)  (1.092) (-0.762)
Ethiopia  2.653  -3.519  2.653  3.159  -3.831  2.639  20
(0.964) (-1.683)  (1.000) (-1.669)
Chana  -3.065  -5.561  2.299  -1.028  -6.601  3.315  19
(-0.306) (-1.397)  (-0.094) (-1.471)
Greece  0.404  .0.472  2.158  0.717  -0.580  2.213  31
(0.482) (-1.133)  (0.877) (-1.170)
Honduras  0.016  -0.324  2.412  0.193  0.323  2.316  31
(0.023) (-0.322)  (0.297)  (0.346)
India  1.118  -5.220  2.012  0.611  -5.152  2.007  30
(0.881) (-3.049)  (0.485) (-3.112)
Jamaica  1.327  -1.770  1.702  1.495  -1.735  1.698  25
(0.874) (-2.500)  (0.910) (-2.358)
Kenya  0.007  0.631  2.548  -0.096  0.658  2.543  26
(0.008)  (1.150)  (-0.097)  (1.145)
Malaysia  0.076  -1.118  2.157  0.079  -0.108  2.157  25
(0.094) (-0.206)  (0.087) (-0.189)
Nigeria  -0.396  -0.431  3.030  2.147  -0.390  3.095  18
(-0.140) (-0.576)  (0.895)  (0.671)
Pakistan  0.204  -0.537  2.214  0.025  -0.790  2.210  32
(0.195) (-0.766)  (0.023) (-1.090)
Philippines  0.366  -5.367  2.358  0.979  -5.937  2.336  29
(0.173) (-2.668)  (0.437) (-2.800)74
Table  A.3-(Cont).
OLS  Instrumental  Variablesb
Country  a  D.W.  a  a  D.W.  N
Singapore  0.638  -0.763  1.747  0.782  -0.782  1.746  21
(0.452) (o1.335)  (0.501) (-1.288)
Souti.  Africa  0.228  0.780  1.887  0.251  0.755  1.880  32
(0.762)  (1.865)  (0.798)  (1.772)
Sri  Lanka  0.246  0.601  2.342  0.289  0.610  2.340  32
(0.267)  (1.435)  (0.294)  (1.400)
Yugoslavia  2.717  -0.394  1.316  2.779  -0.456  1.304  25
(1.397) (.0.665)  (1.293) (-0.653)
Zambia  1.547  -0.232  1.897  1.394  -0.233  1.899  20
(1.250) (-0.750)  (1.0207)  (-0.698)
Standard  errors  are In  parentheses.
aFor  many  countries  the  period  was shorter,  and  was determined  by data
availability.  Only  countries  with 18 or more observations  were considered.
t-statistics  in  parenthesis.  N  is the total  number  of observations
available.
bLagged  and twice  lagged AINF and  ATAX  were used as instruments.75
TABLE  A.4
Variables  Used  in  Cuklerman-Edwards.Tabellini'
Probit  Analysis  of  Political  Instability
1. Government  Changs
Government  change  - Dummy  variable  taking  a  value  of  1 for  the  years  In
which  there  Is  either  a  coup  or  a  regular  government  transfer,  and  a
value  of  0  otherwise.  [Source:  Taylor-Jodice  (1983)).
2.  Economic  Performance
Inflation  *  Annual  rate  of  growth  of  CDP  deflator.  iSource:  Constructed
from  Suamers-Heston  (1988))
Economic  Growth  - Cumulative  rate  of  growth  of  private  consumption  in  the
current  and  prevlous  two  years. [Source:  Summers-Heston  (1988)3
3. Poitical  Events
Riots  - Violent  riots. [Source:  Taylor-Jodice  (1983))
Repressions  a  Political  executions  and  government  Imposed  sanctions.
(Source:  Taylor-Jodice  (1983)]
Executive  Adjustments  w Changes  in  the  composition  of  the  executive  not
resulting  in  government  transfers. (Source: Taylor-Jodice  (1983)1
Attempts  *  Unsuccessful  attempts  to  change  the  government,  taking  the  form
of  unsuccessful  coups  and  unsuccessful  government  transfers.  [Source:
Taylor-Jodice  (1983)1
Years  *  Years  from  previous  government  change.
4.  Structural  VariableA
GDP  Per  Capita  in  constant  U.S.  $  of  1975  *  (Source:  Summers-Heston  (1988))
Democracy  *  a  dummy  variable  taking  a  value  of  1  for  democracies  and  0
otherwise.  [Source:  Banks,  varlous  volumes)
Elections  a  a  dummy  variable  taking  a  value  of  1  If  the  election  date  in
determined  by the  constitution  and  0  otherwise.  (Source:  Banks.
various  volumes)
Majority  a  a  dummy  variable  taking  a  value  of  1 for  presidential  systems  or
for  parliamentary  governments  supported  by  a  single  majority  party,  and
O  otherwise.  (Source:  Banks,  various  volumes)
The variables  inflation,  consumption  growth,  protests,  riots,  and
repressions  are  all  In  deviation  from  their  country-specific  means.
Source:  Cuklerman,  Edwards  and  Tabell'-l  (1989).76
TABLE  A.$
Cukieruan-Edwards-Tabellinl  Probit  Estimates  of  Covernment  Change
Cross  Section  of  Countries
DgeAdenL_VAriable:  Government  change
=AglAnAtory  Variablem:  Curnt  ZAgged  nar  laged  Twi1a
Government  Change  - -. C793  -. 0315
(.0822)  (.0774)
Inflation  .0020  -. 0030
(.0012)  (.0023)
Consumption  Growth  -. 3894
(.26S2)
Riots  .0052  -.. ,M16  .0060
(.0040)  (.0040)  (.0037)
Repressions  .0047  -. 0013  .0019
(.0018)  (.0009)  (.0013)
Executlve  Adjustment  .0828  .0493*  -. 0182
(.0242)  (.0234)  (.0226)
Attempts  .3995  -;.0138  -. 0232
(.0670)  (.0358)  (.0357)
Years  *.0004
(.0113)
GDP  Per  Capita  .13  1-4
(.23  E-4)
Democracy  .6195  -
(.2010)
ElectLon  -. 2436
(.2259)
Majority  -. 3291*  -
(.1341)
fea:  Standard  errors  are  In  parenthesis.  (  )  denotes  significance  at
the  5 (1%)  confidence  Interval.
The  country-specific  dummies  have  been  ouLtted  from  the  table  but  Included
in  the  regression.
Observations:  change  - 0: 1399
change  - 1:  593
Total  : 1992
Time  perLod:  1948-82.  If  a  country  became  Independent  after  1948,  only  the years  since  Independence  have  been  Included. Egnm:  Cuklermsn,  Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1989).77
TABLE  A.  6
Spearman  Rank  Correlation  Coefficients
Between  Different  Measures  of  Political  Instability
P  ,ZPS
PS  .856  *
(.0001)
F  .831  .913
(.0001)  (.0001)
F  a  Actual  average  frequency  of  government  change.
P  a  Estimated  average  frequency  obtained  from  the  probit  regressions  of
Table  3.
PS  a  Estimated  average  frequency  obtained  by  running  the  probit  model
separately  on  each  country.
The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  the  significance  probability  of  the  estimated
coefficient  under  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  true  coefficient  Is  zero.
Sggrce  Cuklerman,  Edwards  and  Tabelllni  (1989).78
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TABLE  12
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